Abstract: In this paper we compare the Hegelian theory of contingence with the concept of cannibal metaphysics as described by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, a Brazilian anthropologist, in order to show how these bring us resources for a non-identitarian theory of identification in psychoanalysis; an identification which we need to solve some clinical problems, as well as to give a narrative reference to the sexuation formulas of Lacan.

Key Words: Hegel, Lacan, identification, Anthropology, Psychoanalysis

1. Introduction

Hegel's thought has been both embraced and found renewal in the field of psychoanalysis. Authors such as Žižek, Laclau and Mouffe have demonstrated the strength of combining critical reflections of German idealism with the psychanalysis of Jacques Lacan towards an analysis of culture and critical social theory. Authors such as Arantes and Olgivie have demonstrated the impact of reading Hegel had on Lacan during later moments of his work. In my previous work, I have argued that we can encounter three modes of appropriation of Hegel via Lacan. The first concerns the importation of method: to read the course of the psychoanalytical treatment as a dialectical experience: taking the inversions and returns of the consciousness to itself as logical passages of the psychoanalytic treatment which is understood, as a whole, as a dialectical experience. The second mode consists of absorbing a theory of recognition, from within which the notion of subject can be properly introduced in psychoanalysis, supplementing the Freudian theory of narcissism around the figures of the Master and the Slave, most present in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit. During this second moment the theory of recognition is deepened, initially gestated under the influence of anthropogenesis, brought about by Kojève into Hegel's text in the 1930s, and through with which the importance of the crucial logic of negativity becomes gradually highlighted. This is especially so under the influence of Hyppolitte's reading in the 1950s. An important difference, for our purposes, is that an identitarian concept of recognition arises between these two Lacanian references of Hegel.

In Kojève's work, this takes place at the cost of an anthropology that supposes that, although we are divided between Slaves (Herr) and Masters (Knecht), we are all nevertheless united in our human and non-animal identity:

'The attitude of the master is that of an existential impasse: the master does not obtain the recognition he desires, since he is
recognized by a unfree consciousness. He realizes this: impasse. The bondsman, on the other hand, recognizes the lord’s freedom. It is only left for him to make himself recognized by the master in order to arrive at true recognition, that is, mutual recognition. The existence of the master is ‘justified’ when he transformes - through strife - conscious animals into slaves who will one day become free men.”

In Hyppolitte’s work this is resolved through the universalist progress of identity which departs from the Master as immediate consciousness (I = I) and where the Slave is represented as the mediation of essence; that is, through a system of negations that does not need passages between the animal and the human, the barbarian and the civilized, the child and the adult:

“What the master brings upon the bondsman, the bondsman brings upon himself, that is, recognizes him as a bondsman; thus, his operation is that of the lord, it has no meaning of its own, it depends on the essential operation of the master. However, what the bondsman does upon himself he does not do upon the lord, and what the lord does upon the bondsman he does not do upon himself. The true of the master’s consciousness is the inessential consciousness of the bondsman.”

One notes here the origin of the Lacanian theme of the subjective division between knowing and truth, as an infinite dialectic, without solution or agreement, nor the cure for a terminal experience of recognition. This variation is important because it shows how, through perspectives distinctive from the theory of recognition, that subsequently its concept of identification remains dependent on the presumed identity, although contradictory, between the subject and the world.

Many commentators and interpreters of Lacan’s teaching argue that the importance of Hegel to Lacan culminates and disappears after the 1960s, notably with the introduction of the concept of the objet a. Here we follow Safatle in his thesis that it is, on the contrary, from this third moment onwards that Lacan radicalizes his appropriation of Hegel. However, it is from here that there is a consistent support from the Science of Logic as well as a more rigorous use of the notion of the Real. The persistent criticisms of Hegel in terms of synthesis and intersubjectivity, as insistentes criticas ao Hegel da síntese e da intersubjetividade, in the Lacanian texts of the 1960s, neglect that the

The idea that there are alternative and rival logical systems, derived particularly from the idea of negation and the critique of the idealized character of pure semantic, which bring logical systems and real logical structures into equivalency, form two fundamental aspects of the Hegelian logic: its emphasis on negativity and its relation to the concept of the world. Lacan’s criticism of metalanguage (purely logical systems in a formal sense), his refusal of a non-narrative and non-exhaustive concept of truth (truth in a structure of fiction) and his critique of the theory of possible worlds (that there is no universal discourse), are all indications of the proximity I want to introduce.

Our hypothesis is that when Lacan deals with sexuation there emerges a non-identitarian theory of recognition, better yet, a theory of the failure of recognition and the limit point that he does not want to reach. This point is named precisely as the Real. Here, he is able to preserve Hegel’s universalism, getting rid of its identitarianism.

To do so, he has to settle accounts with the anthropology inherited from Kojève and the theory of negativity taken from Hyppolite.

2. Totem and Taboo as an identitarian myth:

After being killed and successively buried in the 1960s, we are surprised by the flashing reappearance of the opening pages of Seminar 17 The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, in which we realize that this first discourse, the discourse of the unconscious, the discourse from which

1 Kojève 2002, p. 53.
2 Hyppolite 2003, p. 188.
3 Costa 1979, p. 218.
4 Ibid., p. 250.
5 Ibid., p. 255.
others will be deduced, by progression or regression, is nothing more than the logical form of the Hegelian discourse of the Master:

“But what must be understood in this schema, as it was already indicated when we placed the S2, of the master’s discourse, in the place of the slave, and then placed it in the discourse of the modernized master (...) in the place that Hegel, the most sublime of hysteries, designates in the discourse of the lord, as being that of truth, (...) which I call hysteria (...) this historic machine, never reaches absolute knowledge (...) to mark the annulment, the failure, the vanishing of the only thing which motivates the function of knowledge: its dialectics with enjoyment”

But if this discourse of the Master without sex, of the universal consciousness of the subject, opens itself up with reference to Hegel, it takes on a no less unusual memory of Lévi-Strauss. Here, Lacanian intuition seems to be that the two founding myths of psychoanalysis, the historical myth of Oedipus and the anthropological myth of Totem and Taboo are not complementary, but rather, contradictory.

“No one ever seems to have been flabbergasted by this curious thing, the extent to which Totem and Taboo has nothing to do with the current use of the Sophoclean reference.”

Truth can only be semi-dictated because its two halves do not come together. The dead father of Totem and Taboo, the origin of civilization and the symbol of the prohibition of incest, does not fit the royal father, an agent of imaginary castration in the equine nightmares of little Hans. This occurs because while one dialectic is concerned with the recognition of (symbolic) consciousness, the other requires the discernment that this process of recognition involves the reality within which it is developed. They are two crossed logics, one of knowledge and the other of truth, the real one being between them. The distinction between the Wirklichkeit (relational reality) and this Realität (negative reality) will be expressed years later in the thesis on the side of the man:

Formulation 1: “The inscription in the phallic function (castration) is valid for all.”

Formulation 2: “There is at least one who is an exception to this rule: the Father of the Primordial Horde (Urvater).”

The Oedipal existential-particular discovery relates to its totemistic universalization from a speculative or paraconsistent identity between these two formulations. As it happens, the tensions between Anthropology and History are deeper than we may think, and few have observed that this restriction clause matters to Lacan in his theory of discourse:

“In the so-called primitive societies, insofar as I inscribe them as not being dominated by the master's discourse - I say this for whoever wants to dig a little deeper - it is quite likely that the master signifier would be demarcated through a more complex economy”

Just as there is a distinction between the old Master (from ancient Greece) and the discourse of the modern (capitalist) Master, there is also a structural difference between the discourse of the Master himself as a prevailing social link (modern and ancient), of the social bond in so-called “primitive societies.” It is a difference based on the differential economy of the Master signifier.

Now we come to a certain affinity between the “man” side of the formulas of sexuation and totemism expressed in two figures of the Lacanian consciousness: Oedipus and the Father of the Primitive Horde. Let us here note now that the Freudian precedent of these two figures goes back to his theory of identification. The fulcrum of his theory of identification is the anthropophagic experience. Here we are no longer only in the order of myth, but also within the order of concrete ritual practices involving war-waging, imprisoning, captivity, killing, and the ingesting of the other. It turns out that based on the totemism that prevailed in his anthropological references, like Atkinson, Robertson Smith, and others also moved towards the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, the doctrine of sacrifice always remained subordinated to the mythical one of the Totem. With this we inherit an incorporative and possessivist conception of the anthropophagic incorporation. Within this we also find difficulties similar to those we present between Hyppolite and Kojève. We assume that to join these is to know who the Masters are (us) and who the potential Slaves are (them). Slaves are potential enemies, but while included in the category of the Other, they are also potential friends, with whom it is possible to exchange words and women through formations of alliance. Therefore, the universal theme of parricide must be divided into two: the murder of the friend or of the enemy. Regardless of this indeterminacy, it is ascertained that whenever I ingest parts of the Other, I assimilate something that was not originally mine, and in addition I come to possess a trace, by which I increase my range of identifications.

7 Ibid, P.115, “… the analytic relationship is based on a love of truth- that is, on a recognition of realities” (p.166)
8 Ibid., p.93.
That is why of all three forms of identification described by Freud, the first being the primary identification, (Uridentificazione) is performed with the father. However, if the real Father is the agent of castration, he must be a father before he is real; and therefore dead and thus, symbolic.

We can read the Freudian theory of identification in its narrow approximation with Hegel as understood as a logical-ontological theory of identity, based on three ideas:

1. The temporal production of the identification between knowing and being takes place through acts of identification. The work of returning to mnemonic traits of perception, repetition as a fundamental expression of the death drive, the unitary trace as an inscription of the turns of the demand on itself, which remains a negative element.

2. Identifications are procedural mediations between being and having, between desire and demand, between the subject and the Other, between the signifier and the subject, and so on. In these mediations, the transformations carried out at the level of knowledge have an ontological effect, such as “the transformation that occurs in the subject when he assumes an image”.

3. The identification departs from its presuppositions (history of previous identifications) and is presented through negations (activity-passivity, return to self, negation, sublimation), retroacts upon the subject and transforms it into what it already was, without knowing it.

There is a premise hidden in this series of theses around identification: I always know who we are and who they are. Along with totemism, psychoanalysis imported an identitarian conception of identification, which Lacan tried to mitigate first with the concept of the totemism, psychoanalysis imported an identitarian conception of identification:

(1) The identification departs from its presuppositions (history of previous identifications) and is presented through negations (activity-passivity, return to self, negation, sublimation), retroacts upon the subject and transforms it into what it already was, without knowing it.

This is not only a metapsychological problem, but also a point of convergence between many small clinical difficulties, to which I have been devoting myself and which I summarize below in more detail:

(a) The situation of an infinite elaboration of mourning, where all the conditions for the elaboration of a loss are met and yet the mourning does not end: This process is sometimes called melancholy, and without knowing exactly how this possibility, occurs in cases of non-psychosis.

(b) The situation in which the transference is organized in the co-presence of intransitive and anguished demands of personal love, simultaneously attacks any sign of response: The coexistence of narcissistic intolerances with schizoid anguish has been called, by non-Lacanian psychoanalytic traditions, border states or borderline personality.

(c) The situation in which there is a kind of failure in the constitution of the relation of transfer: The narrative of suffering seems to be completely subsumed in the discursive ties of the Master (or the University). There is no fissure in the knowledge regarding the symptom and the identification towards the Master signifier comprises on the one side of a “weak jouissance” and on the other a “petrification” of alienation.

3. Animist Perspectivism

Totemism in general, and particularly its consequences for psychoanalysis, seems to have found an important alternative in the findings of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s ethnographic research along with the upper Xingu populations such as the Arawetés and Kaiapós. Such groups obviously have systems of kinship governed by the prohibitions and nominations described by Lévi-Strauss, but there is also a significant part of their social bond that is organized by another principle that is neither symmetrical nor complementary to that of totemism. The former student of the author of Pensée Sauvage, called this other form of organization Amerindian perspectivism. This anti-narcissistic cosmology takes indigenous theories in strict continuity with their intellectual pragmatics, reversing the relationship, consolidated since modernity, whereby there is a single, fixed and definite ontology around which different epistemologies are presented, or more precisely, a point of view with their devices of recognition, classification, predication and judgment. Regarding perspectivism, it is on the contrary that there is a single epistemology and the worlds produced move, adjusted or referred to this epistemology. However, at the heart of this epistemology the pre-definition of “we” is indeterminate: it includes animals, spirits, gods, the dead, enemies made allies, but also allies reversed into enemies. It is not a question of revising the relationship between people and things, us and them, humans and nonhumans, but rather of unrealizing and blurring their borders, according to the institute of affinity, which is so present in these South American communities.

What we have here is a review of the classic thesis brought by Lacan from Lévi-Strass: that the taboo of incest is the law that separates culture and nature, since that, from then on, there are several natures forming a kind of multi-naturalism. This intuition unfolds the experience
of recognition into two strains: one of the Same, and the other of the Other. If the negation of the Same is given by the work of language and expressed in Lacan by the notion of Subject, the other of the Other is given via the metamorphosis of the body and expressed, by Lacan, in the problem of the possible and conjectural: “Another jouissance.”

“The European praxis consists in “making souls” (and differentiating cultures) starting from a given material-corporeal background (nature) the indigenous praxis, on the other hand, “makes bodies” (and differentiates species) from a socio-spiritual universalism. This establishes culture and the subject as the form of the universal, and nature as the form of the particular: “[...] animals and other non humans who have souls see themselves as people and, therefore, under certain conditions and contexts, “are” people, that is, complex entities with a double-faced ontological structure (a visible and an invisible one), existing under pronomial modes of the reflexive and the reciprocal and the relational forms of the universal, and nature as the form of the particular: “Another jouissance.”

In this world the Real is defined as a “semitic defect”, not as an ontological unity. This double twist makes of perspectivism an attitude that is both materialistic and speculative and at the same time is neither relativism nor universalism of wholes, but a kind of fractured, transitive and provisional universalism. This establishes culture and the subject as the form of the universal, and nature as the form of the particular: “[...] animals and other non humans who have souls see themselves as people and, therefore, under certain conditions and contexts, “are” people, that is, complex entities with a double-faced ontological structure (a visible and an invisible one), existing under pronomial modes of the reflexive and the reciprocal and the relational modes of the intentional and the collective”.

The way humans see animals, spirits and other cosmic beings differs from how these beings see themselves and how they see humans, since the original condition common to humans and animals is not animality, but humanity. When someone in a trance, illness or alteration of consciousness sees one of these invisible beings, it does not mean that someone is abnormal, but that the situation or that perspective is abnormal. The notion of a person does not apply or overlap with the identitarian registry of totemism. If totemism effects translations, perspectivism presents itself as a “doctrine of misunderstandings,” not because it is concerned with sanctioning the defects of interpretation, but because it supports the excess of interpretation as its starting point.

“The equivocation determines the premises, more than is determined by them. Consequentially, it does not belong to the world of dialectical contradiction, for its synthesis is disjunctive and infinite.”

From what has been presented so far, it is clear that perspectivism

14 Ibid., p.38.
15 Ibid., p. 41.
16 Ibid., p.44.
17 Ibid, p.60.
18 Ibid., p.50.
19 Ibid., p.61.
20 Ibid., p.61.
21 Ibid., p.69.
22 Lévi-Strauss 1953.
23 Lévi-Strauss 2008.
24 Ibid., p 73.
25 Ibid., p.86.
26 Ibid., p. 93.
is actually the non-identitarian theory of recognition which we were looking for. Without ceasing to be anthropology, it undone the boundaries between the human and inhuman, the basis of Kojève’s reading, as well as it works with a double register of inverted negations capable of overcoming the “symmetry” of Hyppolite’s approach. Perhaps, might it be the ethnological model, assumed by Lacan, as capable of explaining the more complex economy of the Master signifier in primitive societies?

4. Cannibal metaphysics:

The Araweté cosmology bears a non-totemistic form of posthumous cannibalism. When a warrior shaman imprisons, kills and devours one of his enemies, he does not enrich himself metaphorically with his magical properties. The soul of the dead reaches the heavens and is devoured by the spirits. However, the ground status of the dead begins as an indeterminate one. This occurs because years may pass between the initial captivity and the devouring. During this time the prisoner can “integrate” himself with the local community, including being able to marry one of his women. They can be called a tovajar, that is, both “brother-in-law” and “enemy”. Here the contradiction is blatant since the brother-in-law is precisely a borrowed friend, the ally, the relative; therefore, conceptually, the opposite of the enemy. The Tupinambá funeral rite imposes that the killer undergoes a radical transformation: he gains a new name, can speak in public and begins mourning after his act of killing. But there is another condition not predicted by the myth of Totem and Taboo. All members of the tribe can eat a piece of the slaughtered, with the exception of the killer. Killing and devouring are acts separated by a symbolic ban. In the Araweté funeral rite, the community of devourers, represented by the spirits (Maais) devour the soul of the devoured one once it arrives in the heavens. The devoured one, in turn is represented by the other dead Arawetés. And the living Arawetés sometimes make of the group an enemy. The Araweté rite is a perspective translation of the Tupinambá rite, involving a substitution of terms and functions, means and ends, the self and others.27

The crucial question for the work of Freudian mourning is to discover what has been lost in the lost object, and, from this, to produce a symbolic introjection, analogous to the devouring, which is mythically practiced in relation to the totemic parent. That is, a well-done mourning is the reduction of the object to its elementary traits, a destruction with conservation, an Aufhebung.

However, from the Araweté animistic perspectivism it is not a question of incorporating the trace of the enemy, but of eating the “relationship of the enemy to his eater”, a movement of reciprocal self-reflection from the point of view of the enemy28. If for Freudian theory to end the mourning is to conclude a metaphor, for perspectivism the sacrificial mourning is the beginning of a metonymy.

The Amazonian figures of ritual cannibalism and transverse shamanism embody the permanent question of perspectivism: for whom is the position of the human? They bring together the duplicity of the officiant and the sacrificed. They are polyglots, androgynous, triksters; the anticipated dead, perceived as food in preparation by the soul-devouring Maais. As practical intermediaries between two worlds, or diplomats between conflicting ontologies, they experiment both the eschatology of de-individualization and the mythology of pre-specification29; that is, they do not become one, nor do they actually live the duality that could give rise to the class or group. They are borderline beings between man and animal, inhabitants of boundary states between the living and the dead.

Perspectivism is not a theory of closed relations among the terms it embodies, but a theory of terms open to relations. The name of this opening is becoming, and it represents a third kind of relationship, another concept of recognition, beyond the totemist law and the sacrificial metonymy30. If production is the model for the fabrication of man’s identity with nature, in this becoming it consists of an identity in reverse. The totemist becoming articulates affiliation and alliance, the perspectivist becoming involves a second type of alliance, called a consensual alliance. In it we find a non-judicialist and non-contractualist relationship of the law, which would carry out the disjunctive synthesis of the three primary social laws, described by Macel Mauss: to give, to receive and to reciprocate. The impulse of perspectivism, if not production, can be described as predation. It is the pursuit of acquiring words, souls, names and everything that is from another to suture the permanent crisis of identity that has structural value, but in this case is not exactly narcissistic. This consensual alliance occurs in the context of the translation or the transformation of myths. The Maais need new souls because their hunger for terms is infinite. What would happen then if we imagine a social bond so stable that the discursive economy remained perfectly stable, with no trace of indeterminacy and no form of perspectivism? This would not be the case for our patients who, despite speaking, do not transfer, since they do not intend to translate

27 Ibid., p.159.

28 Ibid., p.160.

29 Ibid., p.177.

30 Ibid., p.197.
their narratives of suffering, but only to maintain their own identity. They
do not suffer from the narcissism of small differences, but rather with
a narcissism of great similarities. That is, if we think that identity is a
relation that presumes reciprocity, symmetry, and reflexivity, we see here
how perspectivism offers us in each of these cases a specific negation.
Amerindian mourning denies the symmetry between me
and another. Finally, the denial of becoming helps us to understand
the suspension of reflexivity and the activity of translation, present in cases of
narrative deficit.

5. Hegel and Perspectivism

It is not a question of showing here how Amerindian perspectivism
is essentially a kind of savage Hegelianism, nor it is of interpreting
this way of life as a predicted case in Hegel's system. Our argument is
more simple. The theory of sexuation in Lacan, as well as the clinical
problems associated with it as dependent on the concept of identification,
demand an anthropology, a conception of language and a notion of
non-identitarian recognition. Here we follow Taylor's assessment that
the teleological system of history, along with its ontology based on
reconciliation and recognition of consciousness in the structures that
embody the Idea, and ultimately the State, have failed. Nature will no
longer be seen as the emanation of the spirit. Its failure as a program is
an important part of understanding its historical recovery in three areas:
politics, language and anthropology. In all three cases, the recovery of
the expressive power of the subject serves to understand how the
negative power of consciousness allow us to engender the effects of
transformation of reality that condition the production of this same
consciousness.

The attempt to show how the modes of subjectivization in the
Lacanian clinic are fundamentally structures of recognition. They are
based in an ontological negation which manifest itself in a privileged way
in the confrontation between subject and object. But this confrontation
contributes to offer many distinct operations, like the recuperation of love beyond
narcissism, the redefinition of aesthetic rationality, and the clinical
reorientation through modes of implementation of the Real. So the
experience of recognition is not a symbolic and imaginary operation.
Recognition as a transformative experience is a Real, Symbolic and
Imaginary knot. This seem excessively dependent on an 'ontological


\[\text{31 Taylor 2014.}\]
\[\text{32 Ibid., p.185.}\]
\[\text{33 Safatle, 2001, p. 319.}\]
\[\text{34 Deleuze & Guattari 1983 p.72}\]
\[\text{35 de Castro 2015, pp. 110-11.}\]
\[\text{36 Ibid., p.123.}\]
\[\text{37 Žižek 2012, p. 464.}\]
But, in spite of everything, as Viveiros de Castro observes, “Anti-Oedipus” is a book “necessarily, even more dialectically Oedipal” and the most pungent example of this is the allocation of the Dogon totemist myth which questions the universality of Totem and Taboo. It is not necessarily to destroy the categories of alliance and affiliation to destroy the Oedipal anthropology, rather, it would suffice to realize how the concept of “equiss” can lead us to an idea of a non-all-Oedipal social bond, that is to say, a non-identitarian and mutated concept of relation.

This is exactly what Lacan proposes in his theory of sexuality. A schism, or a non-relation, between two perspectives: “man” and “woman”, which rest on another internal schizophrenic between “woman” and “woman.” This is what Hegel called the Entzweiung, or division of being.

“Each sex constitutes itself by escaping the universal through which, nonetheless, it defines itself, either - and this characterizes the masculine - through the contradiction brought to a function which stands for all elements of the set, either - and this is the feminine - through the inscription of an alterity which goes around this universal function without logically contradicting it”.

Of course, if we associate Hegel’s thought with the contradiction, it will be reduced to the perspective that constitutes the masculine, and it results in a masculine conception of the subject. But this is the Kantian Hegel of the first Lacan: more precisely it is the Hegel that led Lacan to think of the Real as impossible. It is the Hegel of progress of reason by assimilation (anthropophagic?) of his figures and alienated forms.

Yet there is still what Jean-Marie Lardic calls the dialectic of contingency, where it is not so much the deduction of the real as it is the production of the Real. In it, it is a matter of questioning the relation to itself as to its Other through mediation, but now this Other is perceived as the necessity of contingency, just as we find in concept and perspectivism. It is not so much the combinatorial of finitude, but of the types of infinity.

“The category of the relation between necessity and contingency is that through which all the relations between finitude and infinity are condensed and inverted.”

There is for Hegelian thought a real need for contingency, since what is necessary in its ipseity would be precisely “without reason of being, and therefore contingent.” Contingency is not a production of the subject, as mediation, but lies in the Real, as creative negativity, so:

“Hegel makes us leave the traditional pure logical formalism and gives us ontological content, or a logic of effective content.”

Would not this passage, the insertion of contingency, be the necessary element to think of Araweté mourning, with its indeterminacy of the statute of the enemy, with its reverse ritual, and with its celestial battle to know the statute of the slayer in relation to his victim? Is Amerindian becoming an anthropological case of Hegelian productive indeterminacy, or rather, is it the opposite?

Jameson reminds us that in the preliminary versions of the struggle of the Master and the Slave the dialectic was presented in sexual terms, as an opposition of genders, which later was reallocated to the chapters on “Pleasure and necessity” and “The law of the heart” in the 1807 of the Phenomenology of the Spirit. Here the figures of the Master and the Slave are marked by the opposition between inessentiality, or anonymity and real recognition. Jameson observes that along with the historical interpretation which he attempts to allegorize - that is, the birth of citizenship in post-revolutionary European states - this is about a myth. It is a myth of grasping and deliverance. It is a myth that is also the inductive myth of our relations of primary appropriation of our identity; that is, it is a version of the narcissus myth and its connection with work, desire and language. Therefore, Deleuze’s critique of the Hegel-Lacan marriage is consistent on this point.

However, what if the Hegel of Science of Logic, dealing with an emphasis on contingency expressed a late realization about his project of thinking up a theory of sexual recognition? The dialectic of the mistress and the Slave or the dialectic of the Master and the Slave? If this were so, we could re-enlighten the hitherto stressed approaches between Amerindian perspectivism and Hegelian philosophy, such as the relation between, on the one hand, a system of contradictory myths about Phallic law (Totem and Taboo and Oedipus, Narcissism and Master-Slave) and, on the other hand, a non-system or non-set of becomings that does not...
oppose the Phallic law, nor question it, nor dialectize it, but travel in another register of concept, in another modality of time, called by Lacan of not-all. That is, there is no dialectic between the all (masculine) and the not-all (feminine), but an explosion of the categorical, representational and predicative unity, which we call identity, and which must be counted not as a relation between individuals, but as a perspective. As we have seen, perspectivism is the production of worlds for the practical puzzles that the prospects demand. It is, in its own way, a performative critique of representational identity as the general rule of relations of recognition. Here we could re-encounter the Hegelian critique of truth:

“The possibility that the representation conforms itself to the object to which it is related only appears as an enigma because one has let explode the effective unity in which the expression (made subjective determination) the sense (made a separate universal) and the thing (made a pre-given content) converged”

This explosion of the unity of the Other is fundamental if we are to think of a non-identitarian theory of identification. Žižek perceived the importance of the notion of contingency in Hegel for both his difficulty in thinking certain aspects of the psychoanalytic record of contingency (unconscious, overdetermination, objet a and sexual difference) and his thesis of identity as absolute negation. However, the idea that nature represents the contingency of necessity and the involuntary joke that “if the facts do not fit the theory, change the facts” seems to be surprisingly rehabilitated by multinaturalist perspectivism.

“The standard reproach to Hegel is that he tries to abolish the absolute heterogeneity of the Other, its thoroughly contingent character. But there is in Hegel a name for such irreducible contingent Otherness: nature”

Nature is not only the other of the idea, but the Other with respect to itself, precisely as in:

“Why do animals (or others) see themselves as humans, after all? Precisely, I think because in humans, we see them as animals, seeing ourselves as humans”

The progress of the “outer” contingent appearance, the semblance or dress of all beings (humans, spirits, animals, dead, etc.) through classically named processes concerning theories of recognition, self-reflection, hermeneutics of the self (Honneth), self-consciousness

(Hegel), symbolization (Freud), and subjectivation (Lacan) need not be read as progress toward a pre-existing inner essence, but as a “performative” process of constructing (forming) that which is “discovered.” We thus come to the paradoxical conclusion that although Hegel’s philosophy of nature is a poor model for thinking nature in the sense of modern science, it is a great resource for thinking of a non-identitarian theory of recognition in which epistemology is fixed and ontology is variable. It is the difference between thinking with the contradiction, the canonical Hegel, whereby “the thing becomes what it has always been” (the process of self-identity) and the Amerindian Hegel, in which the thing is not given in advance, but is formed in an open and contingent process: that of becoming.

Translation: Sabrina Fernandes

48 Lebrun 2000, p. 379
49 Žižek 2012, p.461
50 de Castro 2015, p. 61.
51 Žižek 2012, p.467.
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