The Forgetfulness of Ontology and the Metaphysical Tendencies of Contemporary Lacanism

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Abstract: In this article we start from the hypothesis that the psychoanalysis of Lacan constitutes a discourse that takes the critical exercise of ontology as a defense against metaphysics, both in Science and in philosophy. Forgetting this position the later tendencies in lacanian studies bring us back to metaphysics. These tendencies evolve the consideration of the Real out of time, the idealists perspective about the concept of signifier, the naturalization of the notion of jouissance, the positive of the concept of being and the fetishisation of the practice of transmission in psychoanalysis.

Keywords: Psychoanalysis, critics, science, anti-philosophy

1. Ontology as critique of metaphysics

Against the tradition which associates philosophy with metaphysics and metaphysics with poetic irrationality and poetry with anti-scientific attitude, Lacan seems to have been interested, from beginning to the end, in realizing the criticism of metaphysics that psychoanalysis involuntarily or unknowingly consumed.

Such criticism begins with the refusal of atomism, psychologism and the dualism of substance, regent in the psychiatry of 1930s, mobilizing for authors such as Politzer1 and Meyerson2. It extends into the refusal of the empiricist model of history, drawn from Hegel and Heidegger and to the foundations of science, first based on Koyré3, then Frege4 and finally assimilating Althusser5. But the fourth and most important Lacanian critique of metaphysics will be located in his theses on sexuation, where relations between universality and particularity will be questioned, and its very own concept will be put to the test6.

This program, thus summarized, has the same generic plan of questioning metaphysics as a resumption of what it would have excluded, at every moment, to be constituted as such. This has been demonstrated by Lacan commentators dedicated to this matter. For example, Cassin7 suggests that Lacan is an anti-Aristotelian, and by extension non-Eleatic, because his Philosophy of language rescues the sophists and their disjunction between being and speaking and she says it precisely.
based on the theory of sexuation. Bass\textsuperscript{8} showed that recovery from exclusion of the Cartesian subject and of the truth (foreclosure) is ultimately a resumption of the problem of the origin of modern philosophy. Žižek\textsuperscript{9} has carried out the Althusserian program, with the support of the Lacanian theory, showing how science and part of the contemporary philosophy moves upon metaphysical presuppositions that constitute the force of their ideological action. Badiou\textsuperscript{10} explicitly aligns himself with the project of Lacanian formalization in order to propose his ontology psychoanalysis, that is, the concept of conflict. Amongst us, Safatle\textsuperscript{12} showed how the Lacanian program of an ontology of negativity allows to reconfigure the criticism of the Frankfurt School lineage and to found a new theory of recognition. I tried\textsuperscript{13} to articulate a psychoanalytic psychopathology based on the re-reading of clinical structures from the non-All logic, articulated by Lacan as a critique of metaphysics and its most elementary presuppositions: identity, unity and not contradiction.

In a text on metaphysics in psychoanalysis Ricardo Goldenberg\textsuperscript{14} argues that what makes psychoanalysis a worldview is the loss of its unity, a kind of corruption of its field, whether considered in practical or theoretical terms. My argument, on the contrary, is that what makes psychoanalysis an ideology or a worldview is not a treason of the unity of the psychoanalytic field\textsuperscript{15}, but the suspension of the critical exercise of its metaphysics, which there includes the metaphysics of the unity of the psychoanalytic field. Its main effect is production of a substance called “the analytic” subjected to a grammar of recognition similar to that of the phlogiston. In fact, the conflict that inhabits it historically may not be done only about the controversy over authority and rigor, but also in accordance with the more important ontological concept in psychoanalysis, that is, the concept of conflict.

When Freud states that psychoanalysis integrates a worldview proper to science\textsuperscript{16}, this suits to confirm the presence of a certain metaphysics, perhaps Newtonian, perhaps derived from the science Freud learned back in his day. Let’s remember the three Kantian metaphysical themes: world, soul and God. The critique to the psychoanalysts who opinionated about the world, then shows itself to be a metaphysical fallacy, both because it despises the method of criticism as a common practice with antiphilosophy, or because it refines the notion of psychoanalytic field, in a linguistically naive concept of discourse as the unit of theses and also, because without a concept of psychoanalyst, that resists to the logical or topological analysis, “psychoanalyst” is an empty term or a useless empirical description.

Is from this combination of misunderstandings that it results the confusion between giving opinions about the world and to participate in a public debate. Let us remember that a public debate is formed by the space and of the public interests. In a public debate it is expected the public use of reason and not just a defense of private interests. In there politics and science combine, art and education and so on. To imagine that psychoanalysis would have only originated a reprinted version of a certain kind of social specialist, who talks about his affairs with guaranteed authority, is exactly to ignore the ideological marriage between the university discourse and the master’s discourse.

An ideology, as Laclau\textsuperscript{17} has shown, does not lie in the pertinence or impertinence of what is enunciated to a field or to its specialists, but in the enunciation that articulates them. Nothing is more ideological than to presume that the psychoanalytic field is, in itself, safe from ideology or that metaphysics comes from external impurities, of philosophical nature, or from internal impurities resulting from the poor understanding of the psychoanalysts, of the lack of rigor or of losses of this field. Here the critical tradition will repeatedly agree that, the greatest aspiration of ideology, its shibolot, is to present itself as non-metaphysical and non-ideological, but neutral, exempt or indifferent.

Although it develops in its own way and with a very different scope than we find in philosophy this program of criticism of metaphysics is nourished by a common diagnosis originally formulated by Heidegger. For the author of Being and Time\textsuperscript{18}, the task of philosophy is to deconstruct formations of meaning or discourses that naturalize or essentialise being. The metaphysics of presence, its belief in the a-historicity of

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8 Balmés 2008.
9 Žižek 2012.
10 Badiou 1996.
11 Parker 2012.
12 Safatle 2005.
13 Dunker 2015.
14 Goldenberg 2016

15 “The problem is that by disregarding the course of the field from which we should take the floor, we make psychoanalysis something that should not be: an ideology. It is very convenient to quote Freud saying that his science is not a Weltanschauung - worldview, and then treat it as if it were,” Goldenberg 2016

16 “I think psychoanalysis is incapable of creating a particular worldview. You do not need it; she forms part of science and can adhere to the scientific world view. But this one deserves this grandiloquent name, because it does not contemplate the whole, is too incomplete, does not intend absolutism at all, nor form a system.” Freud 1932.

17 Laclau 2015.
the forms of language and thinking, the assumption of the autonomous subject, the perceptive faith are current topics in the matter. The Heideggerian diagnosis is as simple as it is powerful: metaphysics makes us forget the fundamental question of being. Metaphysics makes us forget about ontology.

There is at the beginning of the history of Western philosophy, he [Heidegger] thinks a work of colonization of being through the idea, as a result that the concept of being (étant, in French), the ["what is being" - translation from Greek ti to eon) would have subjugated the "being" to the to eon: participle noun derived from the verb to be and henceforth the topic [sujet] of ontology. The Platonic idea would be the philosophical imposition of thought of the one.

Lacan shares Heidegger’s diagnosis although not his treatment. The program of the analysis of existence can be putted in parallel with other attempts to reposition ontological problems against their metaphysical solutions, such as the regional ontology in Husserl’s phenomenology, the social ontology in neo-Marxism, and the ontology of language in analytic philosophy from the progeny of Wittgenstein. In general terms, ontological problems are unavoidable either for ethics, for epistemology or for logic, but even more so when it comes to politics and the critique of ideology. They infiltrate the simplest and most indisputable premises of any discourse. Therefore, it is not a matter of eliminating ontology by decree, which is something that the worst metaphysics do, e.g. naive positivism, but of knowing which ontology for psychoanalysis.

That Lacan opposes Aristotle’s ontology, which was transformed into fundamental metaphysics for ancient theology and for modern philosophy, this does not mean at all that he disqualifies the importance of ontological questions in general. In articles such as *The Dream of Aristotle* and in the innumerable allusions to connerie or philosophical boucherie, Lacan disdains the metaphysical confidence in ontology, by taking seriously its entities and the substantiation of the effects of language. This is the honte-logie (the ontological shame), especially because Lacan knows that there is nothing more ontological than to decree the end of ontology. By derogating the necessity of being in its identity and essence, this does not imply affirming the impossibility of being. Therefore, I advocate that there is in Lacan a negative ontology, not an absence of ontology. To this extent he is not all alone, as Cassin wants. The entire Nietzschean project of reversing Platonism until Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze, seek for a solution to the identity ontology in an ontology of difference. Badiou’s program, of understanding the mathematical language as the only possible ontology, is another solution for Heidegger’s diagnosis, in this sense he is living proof that mathematics is not, necessarily anti-ontological. The critical tradition which inherited from the German idealism from Kant to Hegel, through Horkheimer and Benjamin, seeks for a solution to the ontology of positivity in an ontology of negativity, for example, Adorno:

If men no longer had to equate themselves with things, they would need neither a superstructure of things nor an invariant picture of themselves, after the model of things. The doctrine of invariants perpetuates how little has changed; its positivity perpetuates what is bad about it. This is why the ontological need is wrong. It is probably not until after the invariants have fallen that metaphysics would dawn on the horizon.

The Amerindian perspectivism developed by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and that I have tried to bring to psychoanalysis, notably to read the theses on sexuation, seeks for a solution to the identitarian and positive ontology. I broadly agree with Andrade that perhaps Lacan’s interest in Chinese language and thought, has in its horizon the search for an Eastern

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alternative to Western metaphysics. Also accompanying Safatle\textsuperscript{29} and Badiou on the idea that the Lacanian ontology is not a discussion about being, but about negativity and universality:

"(...) there is in Lacanian psychoanalysis an access to ontology, since the unconscious is this being that subverts the metaphysical opposition of being and non-being (Badiou, 1982). 'The unconscious of the drives, the it, is this being that is only thinkable with an ontology founded on the negative and that is what Lacan has in mind when he says that the unconscious 'brings to being an entity despite its non-advent'.\textsuperscript{30}

Metaphysical solutions sooner or later begin to present difficulties, exerting effects of power and of blockage to critique. What keeps Lacan's thought alive and relevant to contemporary philosophy is precisely the peculiarity of his critique of the subject's metaphysics, his deconstruction of essentialism in psychopathology, his destabilization of the homo-economical-psychological, his opposition to the practices of alienation, adaptation and conformity, justified by naturalistic and realistic models.

But on the other hand, the intra-Lacanian debate develops on a very slowly pace and with a small capacity to create new problems precisely because of the suspension of criticism. A moment of institutional consolidation and formation of the Lacanian doxa, faces the ontological questions raised in the exegesis of his teaching, making it more and more clear his objections to Freud when it comes to metaphysics. With this, the fundamental work can not only be based on the explanation and comment of text, nor on the segmentation of interpretative units, or in the establishment of theses in simple contraposition, as if those who perceive the problematic of Lacan's ontology were only and simply only ill-informed, "possessed" by the university discourse or "taken" by some nefarious political passion.

Some counter-examples that apparently reverse Lacan's critical disposition can be found in what we call the process of conceptual naturalization of jouissance, but also in the idealist reading of the signifier, in the sociological absorption of the father function, in the moral critique of capitalism, in the aestheticization of the end of analysis, in the logical formalism devoid of semantics or semiology, and mainly, in the metaphysical use of the notion of Real (the supreme and first ontological question). The criticism of language in Lacan is at the same time his critique to metaphysics\textsuperscript{31}. All these problems of usage and reading of

Lacan, his discussion about being and un-being, about existence and non-existence, seem to be agglutinated in the theory of sexualization and it is for other reasons that it has been the point of maximum disparity and variance of readings among its commentators.

With that being said, I can not agree with how my friend Ricardo Goldenberg seems to characterize metaphysics exclusively as Greek metaphysics, originating in Parmenides, with its principle of identity, and organized by the Platonic-Aristotelian legacy\textsuperscript{32} and subsequently as a discourse of positive belief in being. Once and for all: philosophy is not metaphysics, but also its critique. Metaphysics is not reduced to Aristotelian, but also to all other variants of ideology. Finally, metaphysics is not ontology, because this last one, discusses the problem of fundamentals in general, this includes foundations of science, culture, logic, language, and so on.

The discussions about essence and appearance, about the nature (physis or arquê) of being and the principles of its transformation, the theory of causes, as well as the various meanings of substance (ousia) did in fact consecrate a certain vocabulary in the matter. However, there are numerous other forms of metaphysics: medieval theological metaphysics, modern metaphysics of the subject, the metaphysics of history, the metaphysics of science, the metaphysics contained in ideology and so on. The history of philosophy is to a great extent the history of metaphysics, but not only that. Goldenberg seems to forget that philosophy is also the terrain of the critique of metaphysics. Metaphysics has a history and without it, we can not perceive its true ontological problem. Based on Lacan's generic statements about philosophy, the master's discourse, the muzzy philosopher and other compliments are as decisive for the argument as the Freudian image of the philosopher on the torned robe, revolving around the holes of the world was effective in preventing psychoanalysis from becoming a relevant object for philosophy\textsuperscript{33}.

The strategy of defining fields is highly problematic when it comes to metaphysics. Separating what is philosophy and what is psychoanalysis ignores that what characterizes ontological questions is that which they reintroduce transversely between the disciplines, areas, fields and

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31 In other words, if I have tried to elaborate something, it is not a metaphysics but a theory of inter-

32 "That there are people, very strong people, who come to face what our master Heidegger calls the unsurpassable, absolute and last condition, which is precisely this being-for-death, it seems to me like something that, for the person who today has spoken with the most emphasis, there is only the end of the end, if not the end of the end of an experience that may not be ineffable, - because I do not believe that this is how Heidegger presents it - but something terminal, very at the end of the human night, close to a mutation of being, at least for us contemporaries all engaged in the fatal consequences of Aristotelian metaphysics and other ones." Lacan, J. (1957) La psychanalyse et son enseignement [Psychoanalysis and its teachings].

33 Assoun 1995.
practices. This is why there is a philosophical critique of modern science. And also, why we can perceive and criticize psychological or sociological infiltrations in psychoanalysis. This is why Lacan can import notions and concepts that are not originally from psychoanalysis, such as truth and knowledge, subject and repetition, existence and alienation.

Clarifying ontological commitments puts us right back in the debate with science, not because it makes us immediately more scientific, but because it raises questions whose relevance inspires universality, and whose public explanation, in common language, allows for the appreciation from different positions. To disregard foundational issues, attaching to a vocabulary of exclusive usage, or to "areas of practice", supported by a system of justification with emphasis on textual authority, are historical characteristics of the worst kind of metaphysics. This is why it is so important to go back to the problems of ontology in Lacanian psychoanalysis. It is not to transform psychoanalysis into philosophy, but for it to be even more psychoanalysis.

Regardless of our ability to make explicit or to become aware of our ontological commitments, these are being made in the progress of our discourse, following the historical drift of signifiers, concepts and notions, participating in discursive alliances and oppositions that transcend our epistemological and ethical condominums. I shall list below the main points of post-Lacanian a-criticism, derived from naivete while dealing with the metaphysical thing.

Perhaps it was from the intuition of this articulated set of problems that Lacan perceived the decisive usefulness of an author such as Georg Friedrich Hegel. Not so much for his theses about the purpose of history or his insights on the reconciliation of philosophy and natural science, Lacan perceived in Hegel the solution to a problem that psychoanalysts were not clearly perceived this simple and original intuition in his work: Real is not ontic, but ethical and that he "intends to sieve the metaphysics that psychoanalysis needs to criticize in itself?"

2. The Real Out of Time

We think that time is real because change is real. Its events should be predicated on an ordered series of events in the past, present and future, each containing a moment of truth. It happens that both the past or the future can not be themselves a property of the present event. Therefore, the representation of time is made possible by the exclusion of real time. We can escape such paradox considering time only from the connections between succession and simultaneity. In this case we can argue for the existence of constant temporalities, even if we do not have a representation of them. Here time exists, but its real representation is impossible.

Let us now observe how the logic of the signifier presumes a temporality of the type B, formed by diachronic or synchronous positions, turns and repetitions. The real, on the contrary, involves a temporality of type A, with constant movements between the infinite present and the possible pasts and futures that it engenders. The temporality of type A is historical and dialectical, the temporality of type B is logical and structural. The two coexist and conflate in the definition of the real in Lacan. This is why the real is the impossible (in B series), but also the contingent (in series A). Let us now briefly remember that, like all definitions that Lacan offers of real are linked to the problem of time, more so than to the theme of space or its representation: the real returns to the same place, the real is the impossible repetition, the real is the time between the thing and its reenounter, the real is lawless. However, the notion of real develops in Lacan as a critique of the immanenism of time. The real is rational and the rational is real, because both of them are united in the improbable and paradoxical temporal contradiction presented above. The real is a register and every register is a form of being and of retain time. However, the real represents the failure of the register as memory and symbolization. It is a problem in the very own function of registering (if we use writing as a reference), or counting (if we use the number as reference), which is why the real will be presented as that "which never ceases to not write itself." The real is the name of a paradox of time, not an enjoyment substance (jouissance) to be realized in the space of individualized bodies.

Remembering that the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary triad was born along with the acts or processes of symbolization, imagery and realization. The registers comprise a relationship in the Hegelian sense of time of the concept and thus, when thought outside temporality they constitute a typical metaphysical effect. To think the Real only with logic or topology, without facing its connection with time, is the most manifest indication of Lacanian metaphysics. Alan Juranville, one of the first philosophers to systematically examine Lacan's psychoanalysis clearly perceived this simple and original intuition in his work: Real is the time.

The central problem that separates classical metaphysics from ontology is the problem of time. So when Lacan responds to Miller, saying that his unconscious is not ontic, but ethical and that he "intends to sieve it in a temporal structure" he is clearly pointed and committed at a kind of ontology, not to a metaphysics. This is why it does not suffice to say that:

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34 McTagart 2010.


Ontology and metaphysics are almost synonymous. That's when the word metaphysics is not simply used to say "philosophy" (...) psychology is today the danger of the psychoanalyst. The psychologist, coming from the ranks of philosophy and religion, full of love and meaning to give. Why religion? Because sense is always religious, since it does allow the being to consist.\textsuperscript{37}

Metaphysics is not ontology. The association between being and meaning presumes that there is only one metaphysics and that it involves a positive consideration of being and meaning. Not even the history of religion can agree with this once it includes, for example, the apophatic tradition, or negative theology, which deals with the lack of meaning and inaccessibility of the divine, a tradition that Lacan cites from top to bottom in his work on Angelus Silesius to Jacob Bohéme and the Rhenanian mystics of the twelfth century. Psychoanalysis does not resume itself neither to this criticism of meaning nor to the refusal of psychological or philosophical hermeneutics. The discourse on the little of sense or on the little of reality is first and foremost a discourse, producer and inductor of sense.

It is important not to confuse the critique of Aristotle's metaphysics with a refusal of ontology. The program of "emptying the being" presumes an ontology, even if it is not the Elatic ontology. Lacan speaks of the being of the subject, of the unfathomable decision of being (the decision of neurosis), the being of enjoyment, the being of man (which cannot be understood without his madness), the being of language (which makes it man), the passions of being, not to speak of the grammar of oppositions between "not being and not thinking" (which characterizes the psychoanalytic act). Not to mention the "ontological moment of anxiety". There are many things presumed in the expression "consistency of being". Its inverse may imply its non-necessity (contingency), its lack of unity (division), its non-identity (multiplicity) its loss or absence (alienation) and finally its non-particularity or universality (singular).

Safatle\textsuperscript{38} called this underlying program of Lacan's attitude toward metaphysics of negative ontology. If there is "no patient who is not a student of Aristotle"\textsuperscript{39} this should lead us to think that psychoanalysis is a kind of cure for the metaphysics of identity that we usually locate in the stagirite, and not that it does not have any ontology. If there is something which sets it apart, is the presence of a critique of temporality, consequently of the causality and positivity of being.

Opposing to this program which we call, the metaphysical tendencies of the contemporary Lacanism, practices exactly the opposite in its "aesthetic" and "logical" praise of the real. A real out of time, positive and indifferent to significant coincidence.

3. The Idealism of the Significant

A second Lacanian metaphysical tendency proposes a kind of return to Lacan, insisting on the logical or linguistic foundation that would have gone through his theorization from Lévi-Strauss' anthropology to the linguistics of Saussure to Jacobson and later on, to the topological formalizations. For them:

Lacanian metaphysics would work with the idea that there is no other being but those produced by meanings from the signifiers, and this being has no consistency outside the world of word and speech. The being would be imaginary and produced by the symbolic.\textsuperscript{40}

The opposition, here presumed, between the true being of the signifier-signified and the false being of the imaginary-in-the-world, is a well-known case of idealistic metaphysics, retaking the misconception of false opposition between transcendental idealism and naive realism. What is "inside language" is opposed to what is "outside language" in an analogous way to what belongs to reason and what is out of reason, what belongs to being (logos) and what is outside it. On one side being, on the other nothing.

Against this, we must remember Lacan's hegelianism when affirming that the real is rational and the rational is real, thus, there is a speculative identity between the exterior and the interior and this identity is given in time. It is therefore crucial not to reduce Lacanism to a Kantian criticism of empiricism:

The ethics of the psychoanalyst consists in (...) eliminating all consistency of content of the speeches, suspend the referent for the benefit of thinking sense as an effect of the pure play of signifiers. Because signifiers may have no body, but are perfectly materials.\textsuperscript{41}

It is absolutely not a question of suspending the reference, but of realizing that Lacan introduces a negative reference: the zero, emptiness, lack, nothingness. This negative reference has a crucial in Lacan's thought.

\textsuperscript{37} Goldenberg 2016, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Goldenberg 2016, p.11
\textsuperscript{41} ibid. 14.
concerning acting as a function of cause, cut, or overdetermination. This is at the core of his ontology and so he starts from a critique of the modal concept of necessity (ne-cessaire, ne-cesse pas), as a surrogate for the affirmative universal proposition (the being necessarily is) and culminates in ontological aphorisms such as: "the woman does not exist", "there is no sexual relation" and "the Other does not exist". The confusion between the criticism of the reference and negative reference brings psychoanalysis closer to idealism, recalling Berkeley’s argument:

(...) there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for example, in a park or books in a library, and nobody to notice them. But what is this, I ask, if not to form in the mind certain ideas that books or trees and, at the same time, omit formulating an idea of someone to perceive them?

With this argument, Bishop Berkeley wanted to convince us that all that exists are representations. Nothing making us being able to know how the world is, and we can only conform with a world shaped by our solipsistic dreams. Just as Freud spoke of representations, Lacan will lead us to think about these simpler units of signifiers. But contrary to Freud who spoke about external reality, absolute quantity (Qn) and principle of reality, a certain idealistic render of the signifier forgets the ontological implications surrounding the thesis of the materialisme of language enunciated by Lacan.

The problem with such position is that it forbids to state that its opposite is wrong, that is, one who affirms that there is something outside, beyond or short of speech, as for example, the Real can never really be mistaken because deep down we equate language with thought and this with being (logos). If you forbid yourself of saying that the being exists, you equally prevents yourself from saying that it does not exist. Here we have a case of self-annulling argument. A flip a coin scenario, heads I win, tails you lose. It is an unverifiable truism, even by the simplest Popperean argument, to examine this problem by means of propositional comparison. This is precisely why the theory of sexuality in Lacan is at the same time, a critique of the limits of the propositionality in its relation with the truth and the real. As any radical idealist position, it involves formulating statements about situations that itself has forbidden to think about. If in fact there is nothing other than the being of the signifier-signified, the being of significance, there is neither why nor how to question those who affirm that there is something beyond or below the signifier and the signified. They talk about nothing, about empty about what does not exist, just as Aristotle refers to the sophists in the book gamma of metaphysics. The affirmation of being, whatever its materiality or form, does not authorize any thesis about non-being. It happens that the non-being and his numerous figures are part of the Lacanian ontology:

If, indeed, there is only signifier, the critique of metaphysics exceeds its limits by affirming the non-existence of the extensional universe, of the body and of the subject (after all, it is not that they do not exist, they are only signifiers). This confuses epistemological determination, regarding what we can know and operate, with an ontological claim, over the plane of existence and its universality.

We are obviously affected by processes of which we have no science at all about. There are things which we do not know that we know, but there are also things we do not know that we do not know. Things that do not belong to any discourse, but that affect us nonetheless. In Lacan this is the work of truth, which has not yet been accomplished, in any form of knowledge, which is the basic form of discourse. We are affected by a kind of negativity called object a, and by the gap that it indicates. The function of causality, the structure of encounter of the object a, as well as the structure of the truth to come exist, even if they do not take place in the signifying articulation. Notice here the reason for so many misconceptions from those who insist on thinking the Real without the time. That I can not know this before the signifier, is an epistemological problem or a logical paradox, but not an ontological assertion. For Lacan the non-being, that which is not yet, is not only characterized as an inert form or as an anodyne indetermination, but as ontological figures of negativity.

To assert that signifier and signified are only ideological illusions would imply to assume that there would be nothing real in the symptom, this is not the case. Illusions are a part of the psychic reality, as Freud said, and we are affected by the Real even though it is impossible to name it and even that this affectation passes through the signifier, the

42 Berkeley 1988

43 Goldenberg 2016, p.15

44 Ibid., p. 38, “there is no unconscious, what actually is there is a set of signifiers articulated which Lacan calls ‘knowledge’”
letter or by *lalangue*. The notion of real as impossible does not aim
to deontologize psychoanalysis, but to establish its ontology as a critique of
the metaphysics of identity.

In short, it is not enough to exclude the "being of signification" to
eliminate the production of identity. Subtracting the "being of signified",
reducing the "sense" or curing someone of his or her compulsion
for "being understood" is not to cure him or her of their "ontologie"
*honte*, shame. Ontology is not a synonym for metaphysics, much
less for psychology, just as metaphysics is not a synonym with
philosophy, not even in Lacan. The allusion here is that Freud coined the
term *metapsychology* [*Metaphischologie*] from the term metaphysics
[Methaphisik] and he was always ashamed of it.

### 4. The Naturalization of Gozo

Signifying idealism finds its metaphysical pair in the realism of
enjoyment. Authors as Miller and Pommier have concur with a
widespread appreciation of the theme of the body, of the Real and of
the notion of enjoyment in psychoanalysis. A second group of theorists,
such as Melman and Lebrun mobilize themselves to understand the
social transformations and the historical movements of the practice
and theory of psychoanalytic, seeking alliances ranging from Marxism
towards the comprehensive sociology. In both cases we find unfoldings of the
Lacanian affirmation that psychoanalysis contains a single substance,
and that such substance is enjoyment. In fact, the economy of pleasure
and displeasure, the modalizations of anguish, as well as the vicissitudes
of satisfaction and pain which are difficult to reduce to the intuitive
functioning of language.

Here I follow the work of Eidelsztein by showing a tendency to
think the final of analysis as a reconciliation to being, for example for
Colette Soler, where is indicative of a return of the metaphysics of being
in reconciliation with itself.

Well, this metaphysical fragility always presents itself by a sort
of inversion of method. In Lacan the registers, the orders, the torus,
the *heresie*, Real, Symbolic and Imaginary are registers of what? Or, to
enunciate the problem by the philosophy of language: "What are the
referents of such (ontological) expressions? The registers are registers of
the human experience, registers of the speaking being, torus or
reality knots, but never "registers of language". Sometimes, language
appears identified with the symbolic register, but to say that we only
have "access" to something in language does not imply that what exists,
exists in language. They always appear and derive from anthropological
linguistic categories, never the opposite. There is the Lacanian
metaphysics: start with the registers, to take them as our first philosophy,
to subaltern the signifier to the registers.

The operation and naturalization of enjoyment operates by
reversing this rule. First there is the enjoyment, the real, excess, then it is
paired or deflected in relation to the signifier. But here it is
important not to confuse the argument: it is not because the
signifier is the condition of accessibility, the basic materiality, coming
from Lacan’s Kantian scheme, that "speaking", "thinking" or "writing" the
Real and the enjoyment, can only occur from the signifier. As good
as it may be, this is an epistemological argument, which deals with
the possibility of knowing, not about the possibilities of existence (or
consistency, or ex-sistence). Therefore, to start from the exclusion of
time and idealism of the signifier is not enough to make a radical critique of
the naturalization of enjoyment. In the same way, it seems more
critical to apply the topological method of Lacan starting from the logical
articulation of the signifier and from there, deduce the real, the symbolic
and imaginary, as well as enjoyment as a Real-Symbolic (phallic) notion,
or a real-Imaginary (not-all) notion, or a discursive (surplus enjoyment)
notion.

To deduce the entire work of enjoyment from the notion of signifier,
without observing this difference between epistemology and ontology,
seems to be exactly the case described by Grünbaum of an argument by
correspondence (*tally argument*), once the concept of signifier is distended
in such ways, supplemented with properties so far from what it would be
structurally pertinent to it, that nothing could conter it from then on.

Against this monism of the signifier, the naturalization of enjoyment
and its incorporation into a classical ontological system arises. There
is one, a fixed substance, although inaccessible. This is not nature,
but enjoyment. On the other side of the particle-wave dualism, lies the
signifier, which translates positions, points of view, and perspectives on
enjoyment, how form shapes matter, how categories seize the experience.
The excess of enjoyment matches therefore a deficit of signifier, as
the intrusion of the real must be faced by symbolic processes. There
is a single substance and multiple points of visit, values or cultures
(signifiers-signified) about it. Ontology is fixed, epistemology is variable.

However, I want to believe that this is a metaphysical inversion of
the Lacanian proposal. Perhaps this is better expressed by a variable
ontology, due to its primary negative characteristic. This can be well
perceived when we think about the non-identitarian properties of
enjoyment, starting with the fact that this is not an experience of the one.

In Lacan, particularly in his theory of sexuation, the disparity of
enjoyments depends of a confrontation between the logical notions

45 Miller 1998.
46 Eidelsztein 2015.
of universality and existence. This derives from one more turn in the
critique of the metaphysics of identity. Identity usually comprises three
properties: reflexivity, transitivity and symmetry. The concept of "non-
existence" should not be read as only non-existence or nothing, but as
an undecidable corruption of the relation of these properties, which we
usually invoke to move from the identity of being to the unity of being, two
historically different problems.

When Lacan speaks of sexual difference he does so in three
different ways (1) as un-reflexivity between the semblances or the
shifters "man" and "woman", (2) as absence of transitivity between the
enjoyment of the man side (phallic) and the enjoyment of the woman
side (non-phallic) and, as well as (3) dissymmetry between the woman
taken as object a and symptom in the masculine phantom and to the
man taken as devastation and as the phallus in feminine mythics. This
 critique of identity causes a disturbance of the traditional metaphysical
understanding of unity: it is not about two substances (ousia, substance or
essence), but about non-being in a double way: not-being-one (to less-
then-one) and not being Other (non-one-that do not).

Just as there is a critique of the concept of concept, there is also a
critique of the concept of set when applied to sex. This is an ontological
question: the passage from one to multiple. Lacan takes it up again, but in
negative key, as failure of the one and failure of the Other.

Being can not be one and multiple at the same time. The Greek
difficulty with the two is therefore the following: how can it be
possible that a number, which is one thing - be composed of
two or more things? How can one thing be, at the same time
one and multiple. (...) this failure designates the real of sex,
this has nothing to do with the difference of the sexes, which
is imaginary or, if it wants empirical, instead of logical.

Well, the Lacanian answer corrupts the Aristotelian recommendation
of employing the particular proposition always as the minimal (there is
at least one) and never as the maximum particular (understanding the
case there is none). But this does not make the actual failure something
empirical, even less makes the empirical something that would not be
logical. The empirical is as logical as the conceptual, this is a central
point of the Lacanian critique of metaphysics. The difference of the sexes
is not imaginary but symbolic. The difference, which after all is the most
general law of the signifiers, organizes all possible empirisms, allowing
them to acquire meanings and the most diverse cultural and particular
valencies. But will it be that the bi-dimensional subject does not belong
to this three-dimensional world nor does it receives affectation by it,
as Eidelsstein argues? Then, how to read what seems to be the central
hypothesis of Seminar XX:

My hypothesis is that the individual who is affected by
unconscious is the same that constitutes what I call the
subject of a signifier.

It is thus perceived that signifier idealism is easily reversed into
realism of enjoyment. To consider the body as unity and "being as being
of significance" we introduce a dualism of substance (jouissance-
signifier) losing the originality of the Lacanian ontology represented
by the temporal movement of non-being or of the un-being. To separate
One from Being, is in fact an anti-philosophical operation, but not a very
original one, since it presents itself in several metaphysics of multiplicity,
for example, in the empiricists, the skeptics, the anti-philosophers, in
pre-Socratics like Heraclitus. It is therefore entirely unjustified to say that
the temptation philosophical is the temptation or the breath for the One,
the "inspection of being by the One". As if there was a philosophical
consensus that the being is one and not multiple.

The Lacanian novelty is more in the separation between the
multiple and the un-being than in the critique of the unity of being. This
happens because the theory of jouissance is a setting of score with two
figures of infinity, infinity deduced and understood in the finite, between
zero and one for example, and infinity able to create a new form of time.
This second figure of real infinity is referred to by the thesis of "y a de
l'un" (Hálguom).

Therefore, there is a critique of the imaginary unity represented by
love (Verliebtheit) and the passions of being (love, hate and ignorance).
Here the problem of enjoyment shifts from the ontological question of
women's enjoyment to the epistemological thesis that a woman can
enjoy without knowing. Then we have the second critique which is based
on the symbolic unity of sexual difference and on the unary trait at the
level of the subject's identity. Finally, there is a critique of the Real as
the One of Being according to the idea that the "unconscious is only a
metaphorical term to designate the knowledge that only sustains presenting
itself as impossible, so that from this time it gets confirmed as real." That
is, if the real is demonstrated, if it does not belong to nature, if it is not

48 Goldenberg 2016, p.27


50 Ibid.

51 Goldenberg 2016, p.36

52 Following the 'subtractive position of Being' mentioned by Badiou.

5. The Positivity of Being
It takes an excessively dogmatic and nominalist attitude, if not defensive, not to recognize that a psychoanalysis which appeals to notions such as truth and ignorance, for the concepts of subject and existence, for an active interlocution with authors such as Heidegger and Descartes, for details of the ancient philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, for the Western and Eastern mystics such as Lao-Tzé, for almost every logical tradition from Aristotle and Frege to Gódel and Cantor, for the history of the science from Galileo to Maxwell, is not, in any way, in a dialogue with what is conventionally called metaphysics. Yes, to think against it is to think critically, but it is this critique that defines and then proves the affinity between philosophy and psychoanalysis.

It is highly naive, if not inconsequential, to say that a psychoanalysis that faces the problem of the Real and the One, is not in any way questioning the classical ontological figures of universality and necessity. Eidelbergstein showed that Lacan employs 20 equivalences concerning the notion of being, involving neological and discursive developments concentrated in two periods of densification:

1. Seminar on Identification: manque à lettre (lack in being), entrepensant (being-thinking), quelquêtre (anybody or somebody), pensâtre (thought-being), tantd’être (there-being), D'(être)itus (being-said, to be said), être-male, être-femelle (being male, being macho, being female, being female) in 1967. Désêtre (un-being) (1967-1972).

Finally, I present my thesis: Lacanian epistemology has aged and has not been well succeeded, but its ontology was.

The Lacanian epistemology has two moments, well described by Milner, in the first moment Lacan is a reader of Koyré and Hegel, so he understands that modern science is a matter of writing and of the invention of concepts. For similar reasons, psychoanalysis depends on the Christianity, modern individualism and the paradoxes of citizenship stemming from the French Revolution. The struggle between the master and the slave is the Hegelian allegory of the historical process of individualization, as well as the sociological figures of the family and the position father occupies in it. Such considerations, according to Milner’s argument, would be weird to the field of psychoanalysis, although they define the epistemological cut that defines its appearance and the historical conditions of its appearance as practice.

In the second moment, Lacan is a reader of Frege and Joyce. Here he seeks to question the concept of concept, the limits of language...
and the stability of the classic figures of the metaphysics: substance, time and space, difference and identity. If in the first period Lacan is reading again Freud’s metapsychology based on the epistemic tripartition between structural model, dynamic and economic, after the 1960s he introduced a new anthropology and another philosophy of history, based on another conception and language, represented, respectively, by the theory of the four discourses and by the formulas of sexuality. That which some authors call the third or last Lacan, after 1973, concerns nothing but an attempt to bring together these two distinct and to some extent contradictory aspects of his work. This does not have anything to do with a clinical novelty, but with a metapsychological effort to integrate concepts while comparing anthropological structures with ontological assumptions. Between the signifier and the Real, the problem is not only epistemological, but ontological.

I say that Lacan’s epistemology failed because Frege’s philosophy took another turn inspiring analytical philosophy. Chomsky’s syntactic structures and not a “philosophy of the language inhabited by the subject”, as Lacan wanted, made the progress of the science of language. After a promising start with Pecheaux and Greimas they abandoned the Lacanian category complexity, at the same extent that psychoanalysts stopped reading linguistics.

Frege, Cantor, Dedekind and topology are today a part of the kind of science and understanding of logics that no Lacanian is willing to admit. The logic is now married to neuroscience57, and the philosophy of the mind58 and not with a “practice of the letter.” No progress was made neither in logics, nor in mathematics, even less in topology thanks to Lacan.

On the contrary, many consequences of his teaching have been observed in social critique, literature, aesthetics, political philosophy and even ontology. On anthropology, psychoanalysis is a chapter of its archeology, although several Lacanian ideas could be reincorporated into their contemporary debate. It seems that we are more concerned with transmitting psychoanalysis to psychoanalysts in its own area of existence and to its internal circulation field, than to continue the spirit of invention and criticism of the metaphysics, present in both Freud and Lacan.

Having said this, the Lacanian critique of the Aristotelian metaphysics can be understood as a criticism of the positivity of being, of “being qua being.” This is not false, but that says little about the power of the negative ontology in Lacan.

6. The Fetish of Transmission

Only a few have looked over the fact that Lacan gradually changes his very own definition of what comes to be psychoanalysis. Realizing how psychoanalysis infiltrated Western culture, taking part in their most decisive processes of individualization, such as education, work, the arts and the modalities of love, Lacan expands the definition of psychoanalysis from its Freudian definition as a method of treatment and investigation, that is, a branch of medicine or science, for the thesis that it is an ethics (praxis) and a discourse (logos). In doing so, Lacan in a Foucauldian way acknowledges that psychoanalysis has gone out of control of psychoanalysts. The epistemological frontier does not guarantee metaphysical immunity.

The argument that the psychoanalytic field refers to the experience of psychoanalysts and to the exercise of such method in what concerns this area or discipline brings a last inconvenience. Analysts do not write, do not publish, declare nothing in the public sphere. They act as psychoanalysts with their patients and that is all. Even Lacan said that in his seminars he placed himself as an analyzand. So, what do they do when they write complete works, proffer seminars, or write essays on the metaphysics of psychoanalysis? The answer is that they transmit psychoanalysis, which is a contradiction in terms.

What exactly is the difference between transmitting psychoanalysis and a teacher who transmit concepts? What exactly is the difference, since studies of concepts or mathemes in psychoanalysis do not, in themselves, accuse the presence of a psychoanalyst (a psychoanalyst without analyzands?). Or would we be shrouded in the mystique that only one analyst is up to the task of recognizing another analyst? Well, the hypertrophy of the notion of transmission, as well as the style, is one of the most salient features of Lacanian metaphysics. Here we return to the first metaphysical myth, which is, the unity of psychoanalysis.

What would be analytical about how someone writes books or compiles essays? Are the themes that she or he tackles or the peculiar shape of her or his style? It works by self-declaration or by the effectiveness of the reception?

It is not the identity of the writer, nor his or her professional adhesion to the field of psychoanalysis, much less his or her curriculum Lattes that makes a psychoanalyst interrogate his or her problems as a scientist, to critically discuss its premises as a philosopher or to give testimony of its practice as a clinician. In other words, if Goldberg’s thesis is correct, and we can classify cases in their respective fields, between philosophy and psychoanalysis, he is wrong to present it. He is mistaken by his own arguments, which have made us have to admit that the only being is to being of the signifier, not that of the concept, or that of the empirical set of psychoanalysts and their social ontology. Or would there be some magical property, not yet described, that would
allow to distinguish the text of a psychoanalyst from the writing of a non-psychoanalyst? Here again, one can see the compromise between metaphysics and politics. If we borrow such "analytic" substance that can be lost or gained, possessed or changed, but whose being is absent and non-existent, who could say where the "analytic" actually is? This is how the "analytical" syndics appear, their guardians, their tacit and often oppressive rules in terms of the logic of recognition. For those who did not have access to the "analytic", it only rests to trust those who have the prerogative to recognize, according to their own personalism, where "the analytic" is and where it is not. By this I do not just advocate a mere dispersion, multiplicity or plurality of the psychoanalytic field, but I hold that "A" psychoanalysis does not exist, because psychoanalysis is not-all.

Let us recall that when Lacan uses the expression *Lacanian field*, an equivalent of Maxwell's\(^5\) the theory of fields, this is an allusion to the fact that Maxwell's equations allow to unify the forces that make up the universe of physics\(^5\). Here, at the same moment, he plays with his metaphysics, saying that if he had to choose one, this would be the metaphysics of light. This is an apparent allusion to the particle-wave dualism, but also, in a metaphor for the tradition of the lights, that is, of the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) and of the criticism which he inscribed in his *Ecrits*.

Lacan's omnivorous attitude made any theory, concept or author, usable by the psychoanalysis. And with this, dissolving the classical separations between theory and practice, author and work, concept and experience, disciplines and areas. The very concept of *theory*, is replaced by speech, teaching, style or ethics. This is also the problem of the replacement of the Freudian concept of formation (*Bildung*) by the Lacanian notion of transmission (*transmission*). In the last five decisive times that Lacan employs this notion, in none of them a metapsychological development can be found.

Philosophy in its historical function is, this traction, which presses the knowledge of the slave to obtain his transmission in knowing of master\(^6\).  

In other words, philosophy as metaphysics that stands in the place of the hole of politics, between the master and slave. This is not our metaphysics, nor should it be the metaphysics to subsidize our formation proposals.

So it is about making it sensible how the *transmission of a letter* has something to do with something essential, fundamental, in the organization of speech, whatever the knowledge of enjoyment\(^6\).  

 Letter is a concept that alludes to a program of criticism of the meaning and of the rarefied meaning. It is inserted yet, as another chapter of the Lacanian critique of the concept, as the core of his anti-philosophy.

She [the child] receives the thing, not knowing that this is why it receives it in the very early childhood, and this is the very frequent case of the *transmission of the desire to know*, but it is something totally acquired in a totally secondary manner. (...) This desire to know, insofar as it takes substance, takes substance of the social group\(^6\).

A blatant example of the use of a metaphysical notion (substance) in the context of the symbolic transmission, in other words, the social usage of the word, such as:  

*It is essentially in this way that, it is a transmission manifestly symbolic, that Freud refers to regarding this idea of castration,\(^4\)\(^5\).*

Another time in which the last Lacan reaffirms the bond between castration and desire with the transmission symbolic.

There is one thing that allows to force this autism which is a matter of common language. It is there that I'm able to make myself understandable for everyone here. This is the guarantee - this which where I've putted in the order of the day in the Freudian School concerning the transmission of...
Psychoanalysis - the guarantee that psychoanalysis does not irreducibly fit into an autism for two.\(^{66}\)

Once again, the notion of transmission appears connected to the passage and sharing of knowledge, without explicitly defining anything about the theory or the way of knowing proper to psychoanalysis. Nothing about forming psychoanalysts. Nothing about the formalization dimension or mathemes, only and only so it submits the appeal to the common language.

I am not like one of those who recoil in front of the topic of the subject of certainty; what allowed to break with what was frozen in Freud's practice in a tradition that clearly prevented its transmission\(^{67}\).

A statement that seems to converge to the idea defended here, that what Lacan seeks in philosophy is his critical method, and its usefulness is to separate itself from metaphysics and from its group effects, its closure and its conceptual reification. Here I'd like to add the consideration of Ambra that:

"The central role of the elevation of formalization to the dignity of the Thing in Lacanian metaphysics leads to a sort of thoughtless idealization of the topological 'mathemical' formalization. Which, by the way, rather quickly becomes synonymous of formalization tout court, eradicating the possibility of thinking about other forms of formalization. It is here that we observe the attack on any modality of narrative, regarding the clinical case. This is only possible because this reading of the notion of formalization ideologically parasites almost the totality of the discussions: whether a text has no mathemas, or non-whole logic or topological discussions, it automatically gets considered as non-Lacanian. Evidently, it is not a question of criticizing formalization itself, but rather of asking why any Moebian transit between narrative and mathemes is usually attacked in the name of a formal purity which is, in reality, quite anti-Freudian?\(^{68}\)"

It is neither explained nor posed as a revolution for the formation of psychoanalysts, but in general, it aims at the insertion of psychoanalysis in the debate of science (the as integral matheme of transmission). His appropriation by post-Lacanians as a kind of fetish to justify prerogatives of use and abuse of the knowledge at stake in psychoanalysis is a clear ideological effect, whose metaphysics is yet to be undone.

In this context the Lacanian thesis that "metaphysics obturates [bouche] the whole of politics"\(^{69}\) is becoming more and more a useful idea. It is the revenge of the philosopher with the holed bathrobe, plugging the holes of the world building. But now, he has come out of the dark room, illuminating the holes of the political world with its anti-philosophy and anti-metaphysics. Lacan raised the notion of hole to the dignity of a symbolic consistency, as well as of ex-sistence to the dimension of real. Therefore, it would be crucial for Lacanism to abandon the identification between metaphysics and Aristotelian philosophy, as well as its understanding of being, could be the eight attributes of the substance, which Benveniste\(^{70}\) well perceived how associates with the eight grammatical categories of Greek language, either as a set of four categories, or as a historical necessity of truth. What Lacan inherits from Heidegger is crystalline: the true philosophy to come is the critique of the metaphysics of presence, the historical revision of Parmenides' triumph and its adherence to the principle of identity out of time.

Translated by Rodrigo Gonsalves


\(^{67}\) Lacan 1979.

\(^{68}\) Ambra, Pedro (personal communication)


\(^{70}\) Benveniste 1979.
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