The Jews and the Zionists; The Story of a Reversal

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My aim here would be to pose certain questions regarding the Jews. The way I will approach these questions will be purely philosophical, yet one that beyond its theoretical nuances does not feel obliged to justify its position for addressing such a delicate issue. After all, the Jews are part of the Middle East, no matter what.

The question of the Jews is today very much intertwined with that of the Middle East. Thus, in a way, if Hegel’s idea of Islam being the universalized Judaism had no truth, it, nevertheless, very accurately anticipated the close association of the two in the figure of the contemporary Middle East. In a sense, the Jews are today a question of the Middle East, in the same way that they were the question of Europe during the preceding centuries. As such, any discourse bearing on the Jews today should be clear as to whether it deals with them from a European, Middle Eastern or a Jewish point of view. Yet, what interests us here is one that is beyond any such division; though one that beyond its mechanical universality carries the mark of a strange particularity, that of Benjamin Netanyahu. I speak of a leader who talks as if he is the ultimate victim of all nations; as if he is representing a country that is in enormous pain and suffering; as if Israel is not a very wealthy country, with the most powerful military apparatus in the region and one of the most powerful in the world. What can justify such a well-off country to have such an aggressive and Middle East bashing governor?

My argument will be thus as philosophical as it will be political; and so it should be as today, at the end of the day, the true symptom of the Jews are the Palestinians, and only they are capable to enunciate a considerable portion of what it means to be a Jew today.

We, nevertheless, give ourselves the right to treat the question of the Jews for two reasons, because we are beyond good and evil, and more importantly because we have genuinely sympathized with our Palestinian comrades. We have nothing adequate to say with regard to their grievances, and thus we do have a certain degree of reticence vis-à-vis what we will say in this text in spite of the right we reserve to ourselves to say it. In a way, we are before good and evil, and we sincerely hope that our Palestinian and Jewish anti-Zionist comrades forgive us for being so naïve.

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1 According to The Economist’s recently published ‘The World in 2014’, the GDP per head of Israel is the staggering 38310$. That of Iran, widely considered the biggest ‘threat’ to the prosperity of Israel, is the meager 4850$!

Yet we are not stupid. We have followed wholeheartedly the Jews, we have followed their pains and their sorrows, their joys and their hopes, their hatreds and their apathies, their genuinely unique traits and their illusions of uniqueness and being chosen, their belief in victimhood, and their attempts in procuring themselves the right to do no matter what.

But, after this enigmatic overture - and every overture should be indeed very obscure - I will start the truly analytic part of this study; one which hopes to lay bare that beside rhetoric, I have, nonetheless, a certain kind of rationality which is very stringent, steadfast and uncompromising, even if it will probably upset very many. For, being partly Hegelian, I believe that reason ultimately divides instead of uniting, and so there is no reason that does not bite.

As such, I will begin from the end, by positing what I want to show in the course of my argument, and I hope to be able to justify the aptness of my claim; but first the claim itself:

The Jews were, until very recently, the other through whom the Christian identity forged itself. Due to the forced assumption of this status - the assumption of which was purely contingent, but which had very harsh and calamitous ramifications for the European Jews - they have developed a culture in which they often perceive themselves as being hated and despised by others, even if the historical situation that gave rise to this assumption has largely disappeared, and the Jews are today anything but victims. As such, the Jewish identity - and I am talking about its ethnic identity and not about Judaism as a religion - has no truth, and thus bears no politically progressive connotation, on a par with the majority of other identities, and to name a few: American, French, Chinese, Russian, Saudi Arabian and Iranian.

I have to begin by inquiring about the reasons due to which the Jews, and not other identities, assumed the role of ‘the other’ in the dominantly Christian regions of the world. Elucidating this necessitates that I first qualify what I have said, in the sense of adding to it that nowhere were the Jews the only hated people. In every part of Christendom, there were other communities that were detested as much, as or even more than, the Jews. Yet, what singled out the Jews is the fact that they were pretty much hated everywhere; though this does not mean in any sense that they were the only hated people. In fact, the first hypocritical part of the ZIBP emerges here: from the fact that they were hated everywhere in Christendom, they conclude that they were the only hated people; yet these two statements are not conveying by any means the same signification.
The reason why the Jews were forced to assume this position seems to have been purely contingent; a fact that would by no means diminish the sufferings which the Jews went through in the course of this dark, bloody part of the history of Christendom - a history for which ‘official’ Christianity should be very ashamed of itself. The contingent event was the selection of Christianity as the official religion of the same empire that had killed the God. On the walls of one of the major synagogues in Amsterdam, one reads that Jehovah condemned the Jews to take up as profession that which he had warned them against: usury. This was due to the fact that for the Christians dominating them, this was considered to be the greatest sin, and the Christian rulers often preventing the Jews from assuming any other profession, the Jews were left often with no choice except usury. Therefore, the ultimate irony of historical contingency forced the Jews also to assume that which they despised. Yet, another manifestation of pure contingency had Christianity becoming the religion of the very same empire that had committed the greatest crime ever conceivable. Still, if the Romans were to be vindicated, who could then be incriminated in their stead? Who else could possibly be in that remote village where Jesus had allegedly lived?

A significant part of the Christian truth is the nothingness of Jesus, the fact that he was truly nobody. In addition, where the nobodies live we cannot find such a huge varieties of people. Apart from the Jews themselves, fortunately or unfortunately, pretty much no-one else was there. Consequently, Jesus’s occasional scorns were poured against his own people, the Jews - they were often very bitter, though it is an attitude that every true revolutionary should absolutely share: to start from oneself and the people to whom one is supposed to belong. This genuine radicalism on behalf of Jesus, could, nevertheless, be applied to the majority of other people in his time, and was then used to rewrite history in such a way that the principal enemy of Jesus became the Jews, and thus they became those who had killed him. The ascension of Christianity to the status of the official religion was the result of a change of heart on behalf of the Roman Emperor and offered the least heroic narrative possible. In fact, there were two major reasons why Constantine chose Christianity. First, it was due to its insignificance within the higher ranks of the Roman ruling elites. Secondly, it was due to his presumption that

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the insistence of Christianity on ONE God could be used to unify an otherwise utterly divided and overstretched empire.

So the Christians, given this non-heroic elevation of their religion to the highest statist rank, could not base it on a founding revolutionary act - something the Muslims, to their credit, would do, though more than three hundred years later. In the absence of such a choice, and in the light of such a craven seizure of power, it would not have been hard to anticipate that many pathetic things would emerge from this new ‘official’ Christianity. Among these, one of most devastating has been the blaming of the Jews for the death of Jesus. Moreover, if it is difficult to accept that one could manipulate history with such ease, it suffices to recall that a more horrendous aspect of this revision has been the ridding of Jesus of his Jewish identity, in the sense that in the common Christian consciousness, even today, very many have actually forgotten that Jesus was himself a Jew!

There is, therefore, this strange contingency located at the heart of the Jewish suffering in the course of their existence within the borders of Christendom. There are many possible conclusions to be drawn from this accentuation of the contingency. Yet, I prefer not to investigate them for the time being since they are not necessarily relevant to the general course of my argument. However, there is only one conclusion that seems to be maybe pertinent to what will be said later on. The fact that if there was anything ‘particular’ about the Jews in all this - and I mean the Jews in themselves and not what they represented for their Christian adversaries - it was the fact that they had bred among their ranks a true revolutionary. And as it had been the case before and it will be afterwards, one of the latest recurrences being Patrice Lumumba and the fate of Congo, whole communities can pay dearly for breeding revolutionaries. A good pretext to be used by imperialists to discourage those whom they have subjugated from letting anyone in their ranks to revolt, at least if they care about their short and mid term existence!

Now, back to the general line of my reasoning. I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that this way of conceiving the Jewish-Christian history allows us to see, very manifestly, the fact that anti-Semitism is a very Christian phenomenon: the Jews have by no means occupied the same singular place in the history of other cultures. To cite some sporadic examples of Jew-bashing would not contradict the essence of this latter claim. For as I said before, even in Christendom, it was by no means true that the Jews were the only hated people: there were other peoples who were hated as much or more than the Jews here
or there, but that the Jews were singular in that they were the shared element of the set of hatred in Christendom. In other cultures, even if the Jews were sometimes hated, they represented much more the same position as those other hated peoples in Europe, and not by any means the role of the shared element. The signifier “Jew” means nothing in very many cultures. Many people have been as indifferent to the Jews as they have been to others. For a typical Bolivian, a Jew signifies as little as an Iranian.

The fact that the Jews were brutally despised by the Christians, does not justify the claim that they were hated by absolutely everybody. This inference from (the justified claim of) having been singularly hated by the Christians, to the claim that the Jews somewhat represent a kind of bizarre ontological victim, in the sense of having been the victim of all people in all times, represents one of the most hypocritical and most despicable elements of ZIBP. In this regard, the ZIBP truly resembles the Nietzschean slave morality, in that the creation of this identity hinges much less on the - needless to insist - praiseworthy and considerable positive traits of the Jewish people, than the pure resentment of their supposed having been hated by all.

Having this important point in mind, I will now move on to the second principal part of my argument that will deal with the Holocaust. This part of my argument would apparently convey a couple of contradictory undertones, which are nevertheless only contradictory in appearance and are not at least mutually exclusive. As such, I will begin by a skeptical assessment of the Jewish reaction to the Holocaust, but will then approach the same attitude from a much more sympathetic perspective. The starting point would be to question the reasons that seem to postulate the singularity of the Holocaust. One of the most stellar achievements of the ZIBP seems to be its success in having forced another question to occupy the skeptical stance; instead of the one that we are posing, this other question casts doubt on the historical authenticity of the Holocaust having taken place.

For us, this latter question should be disregarded: I have no doubt that the Holocaust has taken place, that a great many number (the question of the exact number has no importance; either one hundred thousand or hundreds of millions doesn’t matter at all) of Jews have been horrifyingly and systematically purged by a vicious regime whose deeds only matched its disgusting, repugnant and obnoxious discourse.

No person worthy of sympathy would doubt for a moment the necessity of denouncing Nazism and its deeds. As such, I see no place
for being skeptical towards the Holocaust through posing this question. I think that in fact reprehensible groups from neo-Nazis, fascists and certain Islamists to Zionist identity builders share a common interest in elevating this question to the status of the skeptical question apropos the Holocaust.

The genuine skeptical question to ask with regard to the Holocaust is the following: what is it exactly that makes the Holocaust a singular historical nightmare, an iconic horrendous stain in recent history of the human animal?

A true skeptic would only find a skeptical response to this question. The fact of the matter seems to be that the Holocaust, even if one assumes that its scale was bigger than what is usually suggested, does not represent anything particular with regard to the history of genocides and mass killings in the course of history, including indeed very recent history. In terms of the viciousness of the actual physical eradication, the Holocaust does not differ at all from the other crimes committed with an equal degree of ferociousness against peoples in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Especially, given the persistence of the sufferings that many of these latter peoples have been subjected to, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the insistence on the Holocaust as having been the greatest crime in recent history seems to be very questionable to say the least. As such, to a true skeptic, the argument of the majority of those who insist on the uniqueness of the Holocaust seems to deal with the fact that, according to them, they were worthwhile European and civilized people who died in the course of the Holocaust. Where as, in most of the other recent genocides the victims were primitive and semi-barbaric peoples whose death would not bother us as much as the mass killing of humans, in the same way that every day we commit genocides in slaughter houses against animals but we barely bother. In this regard, the true horror of the Holocaust was that the bestiality of the European imperialist project turned inward and started to replicate in the very heart of Europe what it was doing prevalently in those spheres which were considered to be populated by lesser humans, and so did what it was doing already for centuries to non humans to (European) humans themselves. Unfortunately, this way of explicating the significance of the Holocaust is so prominent among many so called thinkers that assuming the skeptical stance which would cast doubt, not on the historical legitimacy of its utter savagery, but on the idea that it represented the crime committed in recent history, seems to be very just. To this skeptical eye, to paint the Holocaust as having been the crime of recent history is a racist claim.
that entirely complies with the essence of that very discourse that in its eventual symphony of ruthlessness and horror also turned inward and committed the Holocaust. According to this view, the Holocaust would be a crime on a par with many other colonial crimes in recent history, and thus, instead of being singled out, ought to be considered as one among the many horrendous and stupefying moments of the contemporary history of colonialism

However, I do acknowledge that there are others who have tried to accentuate the singularity of the Holocaust from a different point of view, with regard to which the skeptical argument does not hold intact. According to this different view, the singularity of the Holocaust, even if physically on a par with other crimes in the recent colonial history, comes from the way that its perpetrators, i.e. the Nazis, justified it. According to this view, the crimes that the colonialists committed in Africa and Asia were conceived for the most part as horrendous yet necessary acts by their perpetrators themselves. The colonizers knew that what they were doing was dreadful. However, they tried to justify it by arguing that the sufferings they were inflicting on their slaves or colonized people were part of their ultimately benevolent will to force them into civilization; trying to wake them up from their primitive torpidity and forcing them into the light. The idea is that the colonialists themselves considered their acts to be brutal and abominable, but, in the last resort, beneficial to the common good of the vanquished peoples. This way of looking at what they were doing, even if in reality it did not discount by the smallest the intensity and brutality of the misdeeds they performed, seems to be completely absent from the way that the Nazis looked at their purging of the Jews. For them, the goal of the final solution was not to help the Jews, through sentencing them to pain and suffering, to enter the path of light and happiness, but their complete and thorough eradication. For a Nazi, there had never been and there could never be a just Jew: the Jews were conceived as essentially mean, and thus, the only solution could be to exterminate them for good, lest they threaten the march towards lumière characteristic of the Volksdeutsch. From this, the singularity of the Holocaust ensues as a singularity, let us not forget, that has more to do with the way that the crime was conceived than the real physical intensity of the crime.

Still, on a closer look, even this aspect of the singularity of the Holocaust seems to be debatable. It is true that the Nazi ideology, seen through the way that they saw the Jews, was at certain levels even more dreadful than the other colonialists’ ideologies. That said, if we take into
account some other aspects of the colonial projects, we would see that this distinction does not hold at another level. Part of the colonial project was to pit one group of conquered peoples against another, so to ensure smoother rule and less expensive domination. The seeds of hatred that the colonialists sowed among these different groups of peoples often grew and reached such heinous animosities that could not but give rise to quarrels that aimed at the complete deracination of the adversary. It would not be an overestimation to say that the colonizers often played the principal role in provoking these hostilities. Not that they really wanted the hatred to reach a point where each of these groups would literally strive to wipe the other out, but in reality their politics of divide and rule, pursued often systematically and with remarkable precision could not but culminate in such disasters. Hence, the recent large-scale genocides in Africa or Asia, often committed by one indigenous group against another group, are by no means separable from the colonialist project. Thus conceived, the Holocaust would become, once again, merely one moment in the dark and horrifying history of recent imperial projects.

Beyond these, there is another element which constitutes the third moment of the hypocrisy of the ZIBP, the tendency to obfuscate the fact that the Holocaust was not just a crime against the Jews, but equally against other peoples who were not only expunged based on their political convictions, but who, as in the case of the mentally ill or handicapped Germans, were sentenced to death due to no different reason than that of the Jews. The implication of these other peoples in the Holocaust seems to be the principal reason why many radical Jews, including many of those who lived through the horrendous camps, wholeheartedly adhere themselves to the idea that the only genuine way to oppose the Holocaust, can be to make sure that it would never happen to anybody again, instead of using it as a pretext for other calamities committed against other people this time by the Jews.

Therefore, to close this second chapter of our argument, the one vis-à-vis the Holocaust, I want to put forward the forth aspect of the hypocrisy of the ZIBP, that which deals with the ways that the incarcerated Jews reacted to the their quandary in camps and ghettos. Contrary to the image very often depicted from these Jews as having accepted passively their gloomy fate, many of these Jews were strong and principled Subjects who by no means accepted passively the Nazis' savagery and did all
they could to resist that which the Nazis had in stock for them. Insisting on this heroic aspect of the resistance of the Jews would by no means belittle the monstrosity of the Nazis. Even so, in order to pave the way for the creation of that Jewish identity that sees the Jews as the ontological exclusion of all peoples at all times, it has been necessary to mask this other aspect of the Holocaust which is filled with stories of bravery and inspiration for all of us who aspire to the emergence of a more humane and tolerable world.

Having said this, I propose the thesis that the Holocaust has to be looked at as one chapter, albeit undoubtedly one of the darkest and meanest ones, of the atrocities committed in the course of the recent colonial and imperial projects. Besides, as with other colonial projects, and beyond the rhetorical aspects that are otherwise very important, part of the deeds committed against the Jews was to pillage and loot their belongings and their wealth. Seen from this more economical point of view, the anti-Semitic part of Nazism represents yet another chapter of the quest for primitive capitalist accumulation, characteristic of all the colonial projects, but performed within the borders of the central Europe itself this time around as a kind of internal process of primitive capitalist accumulation.

This helps us to perceive the Jews in the general context of the colonized people, but for doing so, it is necessary to put forward a more general survey of the ways that the colonized people are today and the different manners that they have reacted to their past plights. In order to do this, I would propose four categories:

1- The first category comprises of those formerly colonized peoples who have themselves, in the course of their later histories, become colonizers. Israel and China are the principal countries that should be considered in this category. The recent colonial undertakings of both of these countries are so brazen and brutal that any reference to their own histories of having suffered the horrors of colonization seems to us utterly hypocritical and out of place.

2- The second category comprises of those countries that have suffered considerably from colonialism and who have not become colonial but whose recent history justifies,
nonetheless, an analysis that would have to be entirely immanent. India and Iran represent certain traits that fully justify putting them in this category. In this light, the incredible level of economic disparity and injustice in India or the remarkable maladroitness and clumsiness of the Iranian state, as well as the enormous political suffering that it has inflicted on the Iranian people, should be analyzed purely and simply based on the internal and domestic events of their recent histories. Having recourse to foreign intervention and meddling, as a pretext to justify these shortcomings and atrocities seems to us to be utterly hypocritical and shameful.

3- The third category consists of those countries whose current situation necessitates an analysis that would be a mélange of domestic variables and foreign interferences and tampering. Many of the North African countries, as well as a considerable number of Latin American countries, should be conceived in this way. Faced with such countries, neither a purely immanent analysis, that is to say one that would strive to explain the present situation by using the domestic variables only, nor a transcendent analysis, one that would explain everything through foreign meddling, would suffice. To understand these countries, the analysis should embrace elements of both kinds.

4- The fourth, and last, category deals with those countries where there is practically no possibility of any immanent analysis. The majority of Sub-Saharan African countries are included in this category. In such countries, the level of foreign influence and intervention has been so strong that practically no genuine domestic politics has taken shape. Therefore, in trying to analyze the plight that the people of these countries have been through, having recourse to any immanent sort of explication cannot but be artificial. The analysis should be, on the contrary, of a purely transcendent character: the brutality and the wickedness of the foreign meddling has never permitted these countries to enjoy even the slightest degree of autonomy. Congo represents the country that would manifest such traits par excellence.
What is useful about this categorization is that it helps us not be led astray by the similarity of the history that all these countries share. There is nothing in common today between Israel and China, on the one hand, and Congo, on the other. Besides, one other thing that this categorization lays bare is the absurdity and shamelessness of the ZIBP’s continual zeal to depict the Jews as the ontologically excluded part of all peoples. If the Jews are that, then what are the Congolese?

Bearing in mind these categories, I think that with regard to the countries included in the first two, any reference to their historical sufferings cannot but be a brazen attempt to divert attention from their present. In the first category, to justify their own colonial undertakings which are sometimes no less cruel than what they have been through themselves in their pasts. In the second category, to justify their own domestic shortcomings and the economical and political injustices that prevail within their borders.

By taking into consideration the categorization that I have just sketched, we may also be in a better position to clarify for ourselves the different sorts of attitude that we should embrace towards national identities in the countries that belong to any of these categories. I believe, in consequence, that it is only in the fourth category where we can still imagine the national identities to offer something of an emancipatory character. In these countries, the vehemence with which the colonial project has been pursued has left very little opportunity for a true national identity to take hold. This betrays the possibility of having recourse to the potentials of such identity making as bearing a progressive political agenda.

With regard to the countries in the third category, the fact that the internal political space has very often been overdetermined by one or another foreign meddler shows that the national identities can still play a minimal progressive role. Nevertheless, the fact that these countries have indeed had some level of domestic autonomy shows that their national identities have already been stained with all the problems associated with identity politics. Thus, even if one tries to use the national identity as a catalyzer for gaining greater autonomy, this forging of the national identity cannot be naive: it should embrace a very critical attitude towards those regressive and reactionary elements that the national identity has

5 For a very interesting analysis of the different modalities of the concept of people, see Alain Badiou, 2013 ‘Vingt-Quatre notes sur les usages du mot peuple’ in Qu’est-ce qu’un peuple?, Paris: La fabrique éditions.

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already acquired.

In the second category, the national identity certainly is in full swing and as such has already pretty much incorporated all the regressive and backward elements associated with the national identities. In spite of this, the fact that the countries included in this category have not committed fully fledged colonial undertakings on their behalf shows that even if the national identity has nothing progressive to offer, the politics which would strive to create a genuine non-identitarian emancipatory politics in these countries does not need to have as negative an attitude towards the national identity as one should in the countries belonging to the first category. National identity in the countries of the second category plays a more neutral role, and attempts should be directed at ensuring that it would remain so.

Finally, the national identities of the countries belonging to the first category are today as regressive and blood stained as those of classical imperial countries. Their national identities not only have nothing progressive to offer, but that any radical politics dignified of its name should consist of an assiduous attempt in undermining these national identities; identities that represent today those signifiers in the names of which peoples of other regions are submitted to humiliating and demeaning, if not utterly barbarous, colonial rules.

As such, I am reluctant to accept that the ZIBP should be opposed based on an attempt in proclaiming the possibility of another, more just, Jewish identity. I do agree that the signifier ‘Jew’ is not reducible to the entirely sinister one of ‘Zionist’. However, given the colonial character that the latter identity has assumed, a true radical politics should not simply propose another more humane identity as an alternative, but should, on the contrary, oppose the identity politics as such and aim at the creation of an emancipatory politics which would strive to go beyond existing identities. In doing so, it may also help those people who are subjugated, in this case the Palestinians, to skip past their claim - albeit rightful - to national determination and aim for a politics that would be beyond good and evil. In this, anti-identitarian Jewish and Palestinian activists may be our best hope for the creation of a politics that would legitimately go beyond the politics of colonized/colonizer. The only politics dignified of the best wishes of all the freedom fighters across the world would be such a politics of beyond identities.

This last point helps to finish this text with a final clarification. A major part of the Israeli government propaganda has been to portray the aversion that the Arabs show towards the Israelis as being on a
par with historical Christian anti-Semitism, and to paint it as a kind of continuation of the same attitude. I cannot but vehemently oppose this hypocritical idea. The hatred that the Arabs betray towards the Israelis, even if sometimes, and very unfortunately so, is directed against the Jews, is of an entirely different order than that of anti-Semitism. The fact that Israel has colonized millions of Arabs does justify the latter to hate the former. In addition, and unfortunately most of the time, the practical aspect of resistance obfuscates the necessity of clarity and precision in vocabulary. In the same manner that the majority of anti-Nazis were conceiving their enemies to be Germans and not the Nazis, and also the fact that during the American invasions of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the majority of anti-war protesters across the world blamed the Americans for the war and not just Bush or the other Administrations, the Arabs consider the Jews, and not merely the government of Israel, to be responsible for the crimes of the Israeli government. I believe, however, that this attitude of the Arabs is utterly wrong. Nevertheless, at the heart of this oversimplification lies a false tendency whose existence we have already identified in the Jews themselves too. This is the tendency to think of one’s plight as being of an ontologically exceptional character.

It remains to be investigated, separately, whether in terms of the realities of resistance, a movement can prevail without making this otherwise unwarranted short circuit. Yet, at least from a conceptual point of view, this is an altogether wrong position to assume. Akin to the fact that the Palestinians are not today’s ontological exception, in the sense of being hated by all (a dangerous temptation that exists when sometimes, some factions of the Arabs portray the Zionists as ruling the whole world!), not all the Jews are also responsible for the plights of the Palestinians ergo the importance of distinguishing between the Jews and the Zionists. All in all, for this conceptual necessity to translate itself in the practical language of resistance, it is an imperative for the Jews to wholeheartedly oppose Zionism and the calamities it has befallen on the Palestinians. In this light, the writings and activism of anti-Zionist Jews are of vital importance. It is only through their work that one can hope to see that necessary conceptual distinction to hold also in the language of really existing resistances. Moreover, this equally holds for all resistance movements. If there were no Germans who risked everything to oppose and fight the Nazis, could the necessary conceptual distinction between the Nazis and the Germans have any practical necessity?

As such, the unjustifiable and sometimes abhorrent anti-Jewish character of some segments of the Arabs should rather be identified
with the excesses associated with all resistance movements and their often-exaggerated tendency to present themselves as the victims. This, however, has nothing to do with the classical anti-Semitism. Israel today is a powerful country with a flourishing economy and a very strong army. With Israel firmly established, there is no longer any meaning in having recourse to classical anti-Semitism. Israel is today yet another colonial state that is inflicting enormous pain and suffering on other people to ensure its own vicious economic development. Israel is not unique in doing this; it is not really doing something that is entirely absent from many other rich and powerful states in the world. Still, the intensity of what it is doing, and more importantly, the language it uses and its continual use of the Holocaust as a justification should be rejected outright as disgusting, shameless and unfounded. The current Israeli administration has nothing to do with the plight of the millions of Jewish people who perished in one of the most dreadful colonial projects of the recent time. And as such, it is better not to make any allusion to the Holocaust in dealing with the politics of Israel, cause if one is forced to do so, the Israeli state would find itself certainly not on the side of the colonized Jewish people.
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