ABSTRACT:
Slavoj Žižek has revived and reaffirmed Hegel's critique of Spinoza, namely, that the latter's conception of substance fails to offer an adequate account of subjectivity. Following Pierre Macherey and Michel Foucault, though, I challenge Žižek's perspective by showing that Spinoza proposed an alternative view of the self that turns out to be more useful than Hegel's for the development of a critical Marxism.

Keywords:
Slavoj Žižek, Pierre Macherey, Hegel's critique of Spinoza, Marxist reception of Spinoza, Marxist theories of subjectivity, Marxist philosophy

Slavoj Žižek has wondered if it is possible not to love Spinoza. Indeed, he asks, “Who can be against a lone Jew who, on top of it, was excommunicated by the ‘official’ Jewish community itself? One of the most touching expressions of this love is how one often attributes to him almost divine capacities—like Pierre Macherey, who, in his otherwise admirable Hegel ou Spinoza (arguing against the Hegelian critique of Spinoza), claims that one cannot avoid the impression that Spinoza had already read Hegel and, in advance, answered his reproaches.”

Although Žižek is badly mistaken about Macherey's objective in his book and related articles, one cannot avoid the impression that a century ago Lenin had already read Žižek and, in advance, answered the latter's numerous reproaches against the contemporary Marxist turn to Spinoza.

Buried in Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks are his excerpts from Vladimir Mikhailovich Shulyatikov's 1908 book, The Justification of Capitalism in Western European Philosophy. In what evidently passed at the time for a serious Marxist history of philosophy Shulyatikov had contended that

[W]hen Spinoza died, as is well known, the fine fleur of the Dutch bourgeoisie with great pomp accompanied the hearse that carried his...
remains. And if we become more closely acquainted with his circle of acquaintances and correspondents, we again meet with the fine fleur of the bourgeoisie—and not only of Holland but of the entire world.... The bourgeoisie revered Spinoza, their bard. Spinoza’s conception of the world is the song of triumphant capital, of all-consuming, all-centralising capital. There is no being, there are no things, apart from this one Substance which ‘expresses’ itself in its attributes and modes without the subjectivizing praxis which generates determinate entities; everything there is, is a fall. . . . There is no Substance which falls, curves, interrupts the flow, etc.; substance simply is the infinitely productive capacity of such falls/cuts/interruptions, they are its only reality. According to such an aleatory materialist defense of Spinoza, “Substance and clinamen (the curvature of the Substance which generates determinate entities)” would “directly coincide; in this ultimate speculative identity, Substance is nothing but the process of its own ‘fall,’ the negativity that pushes towards productive determination. . . .”

Not surprisingly, Žižek rejects this move because, he contends, it would simply “renormalize” the clinamen and, as a result, turn it “into

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5 Žižek 1993, pp. 216-19.
6 Quotations from Spinoza’s writings are based on, but often modify, Samuel Shirley’s translations (Spinoza 2002).
7 Žižek 2012.
8 Žižek 2012, p. 367.
9 Žižek 2012, pp. 367-68.
10 Žižek 2012, p. 368.
11 Žižek 2012, p. 368.
its opposite,” for “if all that there is are interruptions or falls, then the key aspect of surprise, of the intrusion of an unexpected contingency, is lost, and we find ourselves in a boring, flat universe whose contingency is totally predictable and necessary.”12 Žižek seeks, then, not to “radicalize” Spinoza by conceiving of substance as “nothing but the process of clinamen,” for in such a case, he contends, “Substance remains One, a Cause immanent to its effects.” Instead, along Hegelian-Lacanian lines he seeks to “take a step further” and “reverse the relationship: there is no Substance, only the Real as the absolute gap, non-identity, and particular phenomena (modes) are Ones, so many attempts to stabilize this gap.”13

Žižek then sums up what he regards as the stark contrast between Spinoza and Hegel:

In contrast to Spinoza, for whom there is no Master-Signifier enacting a cut, marking a conclusion, “dotting the it,” but just a continuous chain of causes, the Hegelian dialectical process involves cuts, sudden interruption of the continuous flow, reversals which retroactively restructure the entire field. In order to properly understand this relationship between a continual process and its cuts or ends, we should ignore the stupid notion of a “contradiction” in Hegel’s thought between method (endless process) and system (end); it is also not sufficient to conceive cuts as moment within an encompassing process, internal differences which arise and disappear.14

Žižek concludes with “a parallel with the flow of speech.” Just as “the flow of speech cannot go on indefinitely,” there has to be a something like “the point that concludes a sentence,” for “it is only the dot at the end that retroactively fixes or determines the meaning of the sentence.” And yet, he adds, this dot cannot be “a simple fixation which removes all risk, abolishing all ambiguity and openness.” Rather, “the dotting itself, its cut . . . releases—sets free—meaning and interpretation: the dot always occurs contingently, as a surprise, it generates a surplus—why here? What does this mean?”15

How should one respond to Žižek’s identification of the “precise point” at which Hegel’s philosophy diverges from Spinoza’s? To begin with, it is astonishing that in Žižek’s 1000-page work on Hegel there is not a single reference to Macherey. Although as of 2004 Žižek had clearly read Hegel ou Spinoza (when Organs without Bodies was published16), his engagement with Macherey’s book had lapsed by 2012.

As a result, Žižek’s treatment of Spinoza’s phrase omnis determinatio est negatio turns out to be irrelevant, since, as Macherey already ably demonstrated in Hegel or Spinoza, not only did Spinoza never use this exact phrase, but Hegel misquoted him, took the sentence Spinoza did use once in a letter—not a published work—out of context, and then seriously misconstrued its meaning.18 Let us focus instead on Žižek’s contention that, unlike Hegel, Spinoza’s philosophy offers no way to grasp substance as subjectivity and so alternates between either “a pseudo-Oriental Heraclitean wisdom concerning the eternal flow of the generation and corruption of all things under the sun” or “a boring, flat universe whose contingency is totally predictable and necessary.” Neither is an appealing option, to say the least.

But Žižek is not alone in pitting Hegel against Spinoza with respect to the problem of substance that has not yet become subject. In Logics of Worlds Alain Badiou has likewise argued that Hegel’s great philosophical insight “can be summed up in three principles:

—The only truth is that of the Whole.
—The Whole is a self-unfolding, and not an absolute-unity external to the subject.
—The Whole is the immanent arrival of its own concept.”

This means, for Badiou, “that the thought of the Whole is the effectuation of the Whole itself. Consequently, what displays the Whole within thought is nothing other than the path of thinking, that is its method. Hegel is the methodical thinker of the Whole.”19 By contrast, Badiou contends, “Spinoza saw perfectly that every thought must presuppose the Whole as containing determinations in itself, by self-negation. But he failed to grasp the subjective absoluteness of the Whole, which alone guarantees integral immanence.”20

Badiou’s own Hegelian accusation that Spinoza “failed to grasp...
the subjective absoluteness of the Whole” misses the mark, though. Spinoza called his major work *Ethics* for good reason: his overriding objective was how to understand and show how to attain individual and collective freedom and happiness—not to grasp the “subjective absoluteness of the Whole.” Indeed, in the opening lines of part 2 of the *Ethics* Spinoza warned that he was concerned not with the “infinitely many things” that necessarily follow “in infinitely many ways” from his conception of God as “eternal and infinite being” but only with what “can lead us as if by the hand to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.” As a result, Spinoza’s “metaphysics in the service of ethics”21 was less concerned with mereology—the study of parts and wholes22—than, as Bernard Vandewalle has compellingly argued, with refashioning philosophical activity as a kind of “therapeutics of the body and mind” in both individual and transindividual respects.23

To claim, then, as Badiou and Žižek have, that Spinoza failed to address the problem of subjectivity is to ignore the last four parts of the *Ethics* that concern the human mind, its relationship to the body and the external world, the nature of affects and their power, and the extent to which reason can moderate, stabilize, redirect, or transform passive into active affects in pursuit of individual and collective freedom. Since Žižek and Badiou offer only the barest of textual support for their criticisms of Spinoza, we should examine what the latter actually wrote about the nature of the self and consider what has caused Žižek and Badiou to miss, evade, or distort something important.

As Macherey has maintained, Hegel’s philosophical problematic hindered him from grasping what Spinoza actually wrote; for Hegel, Spinoza’s philosophy played “the role of an indicator or a mirror, on whose surface conceptions which are apparently the most foreign to his own by contrast trace their contours.”24 It would appear that Spinoza’s philosophy continues to serve as a distorting mirror for Badiou and Žižek, who have engaged less frequently and less carefully with Spinoza’s text than did Hegel. But in order to see how this distortion has occurred, allow me to make a brief detour via two tantalizing references by Michel Foucault to Spinoza’s early work, the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*.

**Hegelian subject or Spinozist self?**

In *History of Madness* Foucault characterized Spinoza’s project in the *Treatise* as “a sort of ethical wager, which is won when it is discovered that the exercise of freedom is accomplished in the concrete fullness of reason, which, by its union with nature taken in its totality, is accessible to a higher form of nature . . . . The freedom of the wager culminates in a unity where it disappears as a choice to reappear as a necessity of reason.”25

Commenting on Foucault, Macherey has observed that Spinoza developed “the idea according to which the individual has in itself no other reality than that communicated through its relation to the totality to which one can also say that it ‘belongs,’ a relation that governs its ethical destination.” Foucault clearly didn’t embrace Spinoza’s naturalism but set forth instead an idea of “historical belonging” that would be “irreducible to the universal laws of a nature considered in general.” Yet, according to Macherey, Foucault’s reading of Spinoza enables us to ponder the meaning of Spinoza’s “naturalism.” By “eternity of substance,” Spinoza did not have in mind the permanence of a nature already given in itself, in an abstract and static manner, according to the idea of ‘substance which has not yet become subject’ developed by Hegel regarding Spinoza; but, to the extent that this substance is inseparable from its productivity, that it manifests itself nowhere else than in the totality of its modal realizations, in which it is absolutely immanent, it is a nature that is itself produced in a history, and under conditions that the latter necessarily attaches to it. Thus for the soul to attain the understanding of its union

21 To use A. W. Moore’s felicitous designation. See Moore 2012, pp. 44-66.

22 It is worth noting, however, that Spinoza did address the parts/whole relation in a letter to Henry Oldenberg, dated November 20, 1665, in which he proposed a famous and striking analogy between human beings “living in our part of nature” and a “tiny worm living in the blood.” Just as such a worm “would regard each individual particle of the blood as a whole, not a part… and… would have no idea as to how all the parts are controlled by the overall nature of the blood,” so too would human beings fail to grasp that “every body, in so far as it exists as modified in a definite way, must be considered as a part of the whole universe.” Moreover, just as the motion of blood itself is affected by external forces, and is only a part of a larger whole, so too the nature of the universe is “absolutely infinite” and “its parts are controlled by the nature of this infinite power [potentia] in infinite ways and are compelled to undergo infinite variations” (Ep 32).

23 Vandewalle 2011. Although Antonio Negri (1991, p. 262n.8) has been troubled that such talk of “therapeutics” miscasts Spinoza as an individualist under the influence of late-Renaissance, neo-Stoic, or Cartesian ideas, I agree with Vandewalle’s response that there is a political dimension in Spinoza’s philosophy specifically arising from “medical or physiological inspiration” (Vandewalle 2011, pp. 15n.1, 145-66).


Hegel or Spinoza: Substance, Subject, and Critical Marxism

Spinoza anticipated Hegel, for “in establishing a necessary relationship between knowledge . . . and the process of its production, he permits it to grasp itself as absolute and thus to grasp the absolute. Taken outside this objective development, knowledge is nothing more than the formal representation of a reality for which it can provide only an abstract illusion.”

Yet Spinoza's position should not be confused with Hegel's. By making thought an attribute of substance, Spinoza construed knowledge as an absolutely objective process without a subject and freed its internal causal movement from any teleological presupposition.

In sum, the soul operates as a spiritual automaton because it is “not subjugated to the free will of a subject whose autonomy would be to all extents and purposes fictive.”

Moreover, ideas are not images or passive representations of an external reality that they would more or less resemble. As Macherey compellingly argues, Spinoza rejected the Cartesian conception of ideas as “mute paintings on canvas” and defended the perspective that all ideas are acts that “always affirm something in themselves, according to a modality that returns to their cause, that is, in the last instance the substance that expresses itself in them in the form of one of their attributes, thought.”

The upshot is that “there is no subject of knowledge, not even of truth beneath these truths, that prepares its form in advance, because the idea is true in itself—singularly, actively, affirmatively, in the absence of all extrinsic determinations that submit it to an order of things or the decrees of the creator.”

Not surprisingly, Spinoza's perspective was unpalatable to Hegel, who cautioned in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that “if thinking stops with . . . substance, there is then no development, no life, no spirituality or activity. So we can say that with Spinozism everything goes into the abyss but nothing emerges from it.”

28 Foucault 2005, p. 27. Foucault is concerned explicitly only with the first nine paragraphs of the Treatise, but I believe his observation applies equally to Spinoza's project in the Ethics.
29 TdIE 85.
30 Indeed, Spinoza's conception of the self anticipates the empirical results of contemporary neuroscience. See Hood 2012.
31 Macherey 2011, p. 59.
32 Macherey 2011, p. 59.
33 Macherey 2011, p. 59.
34 Macherey 2011, p. 63.
35 E2p43s.
36 Macherey 2011, p. 63.
37 Macherey 2011, p. 63.
38 Hegel 2009, p. 122.
wrote in part three of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* that “as regards Spinozism, it is to be noted against it that in the judgement by which the mind constitutes itself as I, as free subjectivity in contrast to determinacy, the mind emerges from substance, and philosophy, when it makes this judgement the absolute determination of mind, emerges from Spinozism.”

Hegel’s point was that Spinoza could not adequately account for what is distinctive about subjectivity, namely, its full-fledged emergence from substance. As Terry Pinkard puts it, “the revolution in modern science was an essential part of the modern revolution in ‘spirit,’ in our grasp of what it means to be human, just as the revolution in spirit’s grasp of itself correspondingly called for a revolution in our theoretical stance to nature.” As a result, then, “to grasp the revolution in spirit required, so Hegel thought, grasping just what nature was so that it would become intelligible how it could be that spirit had to define itself as a self-instituted liberation from nature.” From Hegel’s perspective, Spinoza’s conception of the mind remained mired in substance and could not attain genuinely free self-development. But what was the theoretical price to be paid for Hegel’s extrication of subjectivity from substance?

Arguably, Hegel’s conception of subjectivity in its autonomous unfolding wound up losing its moorings in the body and the external world. Spinoza’s conception of selfhood as inextricably caught up in causal relations, by contrast, provided the basis for an *ecologically embedded* perspective that continues to be both more plausible and useful for political theory and practice. Moreover, Spinoza better described and analyzed the affective complexities of our individual and collective lives, in particular, the drama of what he called the “imitation of the affects.”

Žižek wrongly characterizes Spinoza’s conception of substance as a mere “container” for the multiple identities that comprise our selves. Or if we grant Žižek his metaphor, then substance serves at most as a very porous and leaky vessel that we would have to describe as an *affectively permeable* container. Although Žižek rightly cautions us not to play the speculative game of “Spinoza anticipated such and such,”

there remains a striking affinity between Spinoza’s treatment in part 2 of the *Ethics* of the composition of hard, soft, and fluid bodies and contemporary scientific research into “sensitive matter” and the remarkable dual-affinity properties of such items as gels, foams, liquid crystals, and cell membranes. Following Spinoza, perhaps Marxists today should seek to discern the contours of an “amphiphilic” self that lies between substance and subject—a *sensitive* materialist dialectic, if you will.

**Conclusion: Hegel’s logic and Spinoza’s ethics**

There can be no question of forcing contemporary Marxists to choose between Hegel and Spinoza. His critics notwithstanding, Macherey has never opposed a “good” Spinoza to a “bad” Hegel but has instead tried to “show how an insurmountable philosophical divergence” arose between them that generated misunderstanding when their two philosophies confronted each other. Indeed, the very reason that Hegel failed to comprehend Spinoza was because the latter’s philosophy was at work in his own and posed an internal threat that continually had to be warded off or conceptually contained.

Nonetheless, there remains a question of emphasis. Hegelian grandiosity needs to be tempered by Spinozist modesty. It is well and good to lay claim to a broad vision of the historical process, and strongly to believe that we are oriented in a rational direction: towards ever-greater freedom for all humanity. But actual historical transformation on the ground looks very different—messy, uneven, often boring,

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39 EL 415; see Hegel 2007, p. 156.
41 See Sharp 2011.
42 For an overview of Spinoza’s concept of affective imitation, see Macherey 1995, pp. 183-262. For a detailed account of the political implications of the important affect of “glory,” see Stolze 2007.
43 Žižek 2012, p. 381.
44 See his well-directed criticism in this regard of such prominent neuroscientists as Antonio Damasio (Žižek 2012, p. 717n.4).
45 See Mitov 2012.
46 Mitov’s term for matter composed of dual-affinity molecules, for example, the lecithin in egg yolks without whose mediation between water and oil mayonnaise would not be stable (Mitov 2012, pp. 5-11).
47 Didn’t Žižek (2000) himself once respond to the false alternative between postmodernism and Marxism with an insistent “Yes, please!”
49 For a penetrating account of how “Spinoza’s philosophy is already realized in Hegel as the true other which he has already become,” see Montag 2012.
frustratingly slow—and then at other times so speeded-up and intense that one may suffer from disorientation or even lapse into what Spinoza termed “vain glory.”50 How is it possible to cultivate and sustain such virtues as fidelity, courage, hope, and endurance in the face of the personal risks arising from activism? To answer such questions we must look to Spinoza, not Hegel.

Žižek has argued that Marxists should “proceed like Lenin in 1915 when, to ground anew revolutionary practice, he returned to Hegel—not to his directly political writings, but, primarily, to his Logic.”51 One shouldn’t disparage Lenin his preferred choice of reading material when he retreated momentarily to reflect on the betrayal by so many socialist leaders of their presumed international ideals and their political capitulation at the onset of a barbarous World War I. Moreover, Lenin was making an important philosophical intervention against the prevailing neo-Kantianism of the Second International.52 But perhaps—just perhaps—he should also have taken the time to read Spinoza’s Ethics. If he had done so, in the margin opposite his famous note “Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!” he might have added Spinoza’s Latin motto: “Caute! Caute! Caute!”53

50 In E4P58S Spinoza defines vainglory as “an assurance in oneself that is fostered solely by the opinion of the vulgar. When that ceases, so does the assurance, that is…the highest good that each one loves. That is why one who glories in the esteem of the vulgar is made anxious daily, strives, acts, and schemes, in order to preserve his fame. For the vulgar are variable and inconstant; fame, unless it is preserved, is quickly destroyed. Indeed, because everyone desires to gain the applause of the vulgar, each one willingly plays down the fame of another. And since the struggle is over a good thought to be the highest, this gives rise to a monstrous lust of each to crush the other in any way possible. The one who at last emerges as victor glories more in having harmed the other than in having benefited himself. Therefore, this glory, that is, this assurance is really vain; because it is nothing.” On the political danger of vainglory, see Stolze 2007, pp. 332-38.

51 Žižek 2004, p. 32.
53 See Lenin 1972, p. 123. For a discussion of the importance of the Hegelian idea of “leaps,” see Bensaid 2007. A literal translation of “Caute!” is “Be careful!” but a looser “Watch your step!” would probably be more appropriate.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


