Industry of Boredom: On the Discord between Cinematic Telos and Ethos

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Abstract. In this paper, we consider the problem of boredom experienced in the cinema halls. We try to reassess it and accord to it a “positive” meaning: the very conditions of the movie viewing predispose to boredom (cinematic ethos). This, however, contradicts the proclaimed goal of the cinema: to entertain (cinematic telos). We argue that the ontology of cinema is based on the discord between its telos and its ethos. The general line of the evolution of cinema consists in the development of the means of entertaining. Films that deviate from this line are called “boring”. Thus, we find a non-sociological criterion for delineating so-called “popular” movies from so-called “indie”: this is the attitude of filmmakers towards boredom. The pervasiveness of boredom in the cinema halls is explained by the historical and metaphysical connection of boredom with Modern industrial technology. Cinema, being the first institution and art born of industrial technology, is phenomenologically constituted by the experience of boredom. In the end we briefly discuss various methods that the filmmakers use to induce boredom in the spectator. “Boring” films paradoxically appear to be the only ones capable to “heal” from boredom, while the “entertaining” films just divert from it.

Keywords: boredom, entertainment, cinematic experience, Edgar Morin, Martin Heidegger, ontology of film, slow cinema.

“A boring movie” is a verdict. The characteristic “boring” is usually what a conversation ends with, but we will try to start from this place. In the course of our speculation, we will discover that cinema, being the flagship of the entertainment industry, has actually become an industry of boredom or, if you look from the other side, a unique laboratory of boredom.

Boredom is difficult to formalize: it cannot be measured by heart rate, like fear, and it can take hidden forms that elude deep interviews and sociological surveys. Therefore, the most appropriate approach for dealing with boredom would be “phenomenological naivety”: when a spectator says “I’m bored”, in the cinema hall or after leaving it, it is not necessary to immediately subject his experiences to vivisection. This simple testimony is enough for a start.

Obviously, cinema is not a place where people come to get bored. “...One goes to the cinema because one wants to and not because one has to force oneself, in the hope that the film will please and not that it will displeaseth”, Christian Metz writes. The uniqueness of cinema as a technical invention is that, since its inception, it was right away put

at the service of entertainment, while leaving aside the other benefits that were promised by the means for the motion registration (only later they guessed to use it for biological experiments and military mapping). Entertainment is *telos* of cinema as social and cultural institution. So, if we say that the boredom experienced in the cinema means just “a failure of the institution” (Christian Metz) in its effort to entertain us, the strange peculiarity of the very situation of the film birth will slip away.

What is peculiar in this situation is the need for entertainment as such. But if cinema emerged when this need became urgent, isn’t it because people began to get more bored at some moment? Historical research shows that in different periods people got bored to different extents. There were times that didn’t seem to know boredom at all. The ancient Greeks lacked both the word “boredom” and the description of the corresponding symptoms. We neither can say that the “bored” inhabitants of ancient Rome, like noble and rich characters of Petronius’ “Satyricon”, are bored in the modern sense: they clearly felt some deficiency of being, however, this deficiency was made up by the slave system and the resources of the Empire, which were abundant. At that epoch, boredom was still bearable for those who were bored, and only those who, properly speaking, bored could bear boredom, that is, the aristocratic class.

Modern boredom still had predecessors. Medieval *acedia*, coming closer to what we mean by boredom today, is, nonetheless, a moral and theological concept. It expressed a fall from God: those who suffer from *acedia* get into one of the circles of Dante’s hell. The prescribed cure for *acedia* is located outside the earthly world. By contrast, *melancholy*, the Renaissance predecessor of boredom, is a physical illness cured by physical means. Unlike *acedia* and *boredom*, displeasure (pain) in *melancholy* is fused with wisdom (what has got a symbolic expression in the famous Dürer’s painting). The word “boredom” appears in European languages only in the 17th century, firstly in French: there were cases when the word *ennui* was translated into German by a lengthy retelling. Blaise Pascal was maybe the first to conceptualize this notion, and Romantic authors were first to describe the phenomenon in detail. After René, Childe Harold and Eugene Onegin, complaints about *boredom* become omnipresent.

The cure of boredom has come into being in the same time as the word denoting *boredom*: this is entertainment. Pascal explicitly opposes *ennui* to *divertissement* and defines the latter as a result of incapability “to stay quietly in their own chamber”. The abolition of the slave system in the Middle Ages and the euphemism of violence in Modern times forced the aristocracy to search for alternative antidotes to *boredom*, which were, in case of Pascal, socializing in salons.

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3 Nietzsche, §611.
brought to life the famous metaphor of cinema (first proposed by the early film theorist Lionel Landry, in the 1920s, and later elaborated by Jean Louis Baudry in the 1970s): cinema as Platonic cave; spectator as a prisoner. Jean-Luc Godard argued in his “Histoire(s) du cinéma” series that the idea of cinema stemmed from a prison situation (in 1812–1814, French mathematician Jean-Victor Poncelet wrote in the Saratov prison his “Treatise on the Projective Properties of Figures”). Paradoxically, an individual incapable, because of feeling boredom, “to stay quietly in their own chamber” voluntarily moves to another, even more prison-like chamber.

Compared to other works of art, nothing is so often endowed with the characteristic “boring” as movies (somehow, we don’t hear complaints about “boring songs” or “boring exhibitions”). But is it boring only in cinema? We claim that cinema, in comparison with other arts and areas of entertainment, really has a kind of priority in the relation to the boredom experience. For example, unlike in cinema, in the museum we are free both in time and in space; in a literary text, we read it in leaps and bounds; we are free to skip or to skim boring places in the book or put it off altogether. The differences between film viewing and the musical concert are more subtle. The first one consists in the fact that films are more semantically loaded than musical works: inattention and skipping a fragment at the concert does not lead to misunderstanding and, as a result, to the growth of boredom (a listener who has left the concert hall for a short time does not ask the people sitting nearby whether he missed anything, unlike a moviegoer). The second difference is the same as between the movie showing and the theatrical performance: this is the “irresponsiveness” of the movie spectacle; the impossibility of spectator’s active participation. As André Bazin wrote, the actor and the spectator in the theater must be aware of each other’s presence, both doing this in the interests of the play, while the cinema screen ignores us. Furthermore, the concert, like the theatrical performance, does not impose such strict requirements on the attention of the audience. Note also the increased concern for the comfort of moviegoers, which contributes to their anesthesia: for instance, it’s impossible to imagine theater boxes akin to “love seats” in cinema.

So, boredom is ethos (literally “habitual disposition, an accustomed place”) of cinema. Cinematic ethos contradicts its telos: the institution is aimed at entertainment, but the very place, experienced from the point of view of “phenomenological naivety”, is aimed at boredom. The ontology of film is based on this uncancellable discord.

From the controversial claim that cinema is more boring than other cultural media and institutions, we can move on to the question: how is entertainment in the cinema possible at all? Social anthropologist Edgar Morin stated that the structural basis of the movie show is the processes of identification—projection, or, in other words, the affective participation.6 Having always existed in the psychic reality, only in the conditions of a cinema hall did these processes gain incredible volume and strength. The affective participation constitutes the fundamental difference between cinema and theater: according to Bazin, “Tarzan is conceivable only in cinema”,7 since his half-naked girlfriend would have caused in the (male) playgoer not a desire to identify with the hero but jealousy or envy.

However, this is not with the invention of the movie camera that the processes of identification—projection have been fully actualized in spectator’s psyche. For this, George Méliès was needed. It was Méliès who turned the projection of reality into a trick, into something that captures us; affectively involves us in the spectacle. Whereas the audience of the Lumière films—the first subjects of so-called photogeny—was amazed at the movement of the train or at the trembling foliage, the movie audience after Méliès could already experience the whole range of feelings.

What we call entertainment is essentially affective participation. But the latter is provided only in the conditions of motor atrophy. As Morin puts it, “The absence or atrophy of motor—either practical or active—participation is closely related to mental and affective participation. The participation of the spectator, who cannot express himself in action, becomes internal, sensed. Spectacular kinesthesia collapses into spectacular coenesthesia, that is, into subjectivity, and causes projection—identification.”8 This means that entertainment in the cinema is possible insofar as it is surrounded by a prison wall of boredom. Or, in our terms, cinematic telos is pre-conditioned by cinematic ethos.

Contemporary feature film, such as we are used to it (having certain duration, form, and content), as well as the conditions of film viewing, are not accidental: remaining the institutional standard since the industrialization of cinema, it still serves as a response to the challenge posed to it by the invariant viewing conditions. Contemporary feature film was formed as a result of discord between the disposition of the institutional film standard toward entertainment (cinematic telos) and the film viewing conditions causing boredom (cinematic ethos). The stabilization of the institutional standard of the movie spectacle in the early 1930s has occurred after seemingly optimal balance between cinema’s telos and ethos had been discovered.

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5 Bazin 1959, p. 96.
6 Morin 2007, p. 104.
7 Bazin 1959, p. 94.
In light of these theses, the whole evolution of cinema art can be regarded as an evolution of means of “affecting” (that is, of the organization of the affective participation): as Morin writes, “the technique of cinema consists in challenging, accelerating and intensifying the projection—identification”\(^9\). From Méliès' tricks and Eisenstein's “montage of attractions” through the Hollywood principle of “central conflict theory” and Hitchcock's “suspense” to contemporary CGI—all those devices seek to win over the boredom-inducing conditions of the cinema hall. Movies that deviate from this general line are rightly called boring. Boring are those films that refuse to organize the affective participation and push the spectator into the anaesthetic conditions of the film viewing. A thin line separates “boring” films from “unsuccessful” ones; those that seek to entertain but fail to organize the affective participation.

The reputation of boring is strongly attached to the directors, who are usually referred to as the creators of the so-called non-mainstream cinema: we can watch the most stupid entertaining film to the end without ever experiencing boredom (the first moviegoers already noticed this fact when it came to comparing cinematic experience with reading experience\(^9\)), boredom that tortures us, say, Robert Bresson's late movies.\(^9\) Therefore, perhaps the most natural watershed between the so-called “popular” movies and “indie” movies lies in the attitude, conscious or unconscious, of their creators towards boredom: it is either a fear of boredom, or neutrality or indulgence in relation to it. This can serve as a non-sociological criterion for delineating these two sorts of films: “popular” movies are marked by the divergence of cinematic telos and cinematic ethos, while “indie” movies are marked by their convergence.

Insightful moviegoers and thoughtful filmmakers tend to rehabilitate the experience of boredom in cinema. Bazin confessed that he was bored watching his favorite movie by Chaplin, and boredom didn’t displease him, and director Raúl Ruiz wrote that what he values in Ozu, Tarkovksy, and Straub–Huillet is “the quality of high boredom” above all\(^9\). Those opinions, taken seriously, suggest that boredom in cinema deserves, perhaps, if not apologia, then at least reassessment. Maybe it seems that this doesn’t need a proof after the rise of the so-called “slow cinema” movement\(^9\). Yet, as we will say further, the rhythm and length of the shot is not the only thing that causes boredom (slowness implies boringness, but boringness does not necessarily imply slowness).

Why exactly does boredom take on such importance in cinema? An explanation we would like to provide for this is both anthropological and metaphysical: we argue that cinema is connected with boredom due to its technical basis. Cinema is the first institutionalized form of entertainment and, at the same time, the first art form born of industrial technology. In cinema, aesthetic changes have always followed technological ones. This double legacy was caught in the definition of cinema given in 1911 by Ricciotto Canudo (who is often considered to be the first film theorist): “the son of Machine and Feeling.”\(^14\)

While, today, the key question regarding cinema is formulated as “art or entertainment?”, at the very beginning of film history it was posed the other way around: “art or technology?”. The then-found answer no longer surprises anyone: “The point, apparently, is not so much that cinema is a technology, but that cinema is an art,”\(^15\) wrote Yury Tynyanov, one of the key members of the Russian Formalist School, in the 1920s. But the very formulation of the question, now forgotten, is more interesting than the answer to it. The first moviegoers didn’t cease being aware that they had a machine in front of them. To share their amazement, we must reverse the phrase of Tynyanov: let us assume that cinema is primarily a technology. The assertion that cinema is a technology does not in any way detract from the significance of cinema as Feeling, on the contrary, if cinema is both Feeling and Machine, doesn’t it have such great significance for our sensibility just because it belongs to Machine?

But then again, in what sense is cinema a technology? It would not be enough to point out that cinema consists in mechanical fixation and reproduction of reality, This Machine legacy must somehow be embodied in the spectator’s Feeling. The form by which the technical as such gets into the human experience in cinema was called by Jean-Louis Baudry “primary identification”: “The spectator is identified to a lesser extent with the represented, with the spectacle itself, than with what brings the spectacle into play or puts it on stage, what is invisible but what allows to see...”\(^16\) This form implies the entire technological process related to the film projection, yet, for simplicity, we may understand by it the movie camera. “Primary identification” (occurring prior to the “secondary” identification with the characters of the film, which Morin calls “affective participation”) has a coercive character: “the spectator, coming in contact with reality through the camera as an intermediary, experiences a kind of submission to it.”\(^17\) This is a necessary condition for the perception of a movie spectacle. Moreover, the design of the movie camera and the

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9 Morin 2007, p. 104.
10 Morin 2007, p. 108.
11 This observation is true at least from the point of view of “phenomenological naivety”, that is, regardless of the aesthetic preferences or the specific habits of a moviegoer.
13 See, e.g.: Çağlayan 2018.
14 Canudo 1926, p. 5.
16 Baudry 1978, p. 25.
17 Izvolov 2005, p. 25.
design of the cinema hall are identical: both here and there, the same principle of projection of the image through the lens onto the opposite wall is implemented. Thus, during a film show, the spectator functions like a machine: human being becomes “technified”. We can conclude that it is precisely at the moment of identifying a human being with the machine that boredom finds way to cinema.

In the 20th century, many wrote about the connection of technology with boredom (in particular, Friedrich and Ernst Jünger, Lewis Mumford, and Robert Musil). No one was so engrossed in technology and, at the same time, no one was so laden with boredom in Russian literature as the heroes of Andrei Platonov. Martin Heidegger has interpreted this connection perhaps most radically: “Probably these belong together: the alienation of the technological world and the deep boredom that is the hidden pull of a sought-for homeland.” Heidegger is known as one of the greatest philosophers of technology and as the greatest philosopher of boredom. The latter, in his expression, is the “hidden destiny” of modernity.

According to Heidegger, modern technology, rooted in Antiquity, emerges in Europe in the 17th century. At the same time, the word “boredom” appears in European languages. Technology, says Heidegger, is not only and not so much machines, but a certain attitude to the world, which he called Enframing (Gestell). Technology is what reveals the truth, or, in Heidegger’s terms, “enframes” the “unconcealed”, like machines extracting ore in a coal mine. Along with Enframing, there is another way of “unconcealment”: bringing-forth, or poiesis—an attitude proper to the art. In the ancient Greek world, techne and poiesis were one (as a way of dealing with the truth), but then disintegrated. Poiesis, according to Heidegger, has a kind of ontological superiority over Enframing, because it carefully sustains the life of the mystery, while technology, trying to organize the mystery, condemns it to oblivion. By transforming the mystery exclusively into material for supply and management, technology alienates the human being from himself. In his lectures on boredom, Heidegger comes to the idea of the need for mystery for the first time: in boredom, he says, we are most oppressed by the very absence of any oppressiveness, we lack mystery with its “inner terror” which gives to the human being (Dasein) its greatness.

One of the resources of technical organization is time. Since the essence of technical activity is efficiency, time begins to be perceived as an obstacle. And while the goal of scientific and technological progress was initially proclaimed as saving time, in the end technology has become an attempt to conquer and subjugate time: time spent inefficiently is experienced as boring. Thus, the spread of boredom is the flip side of technological progress. Boredom is the blind spot of technology.

Heidegger sees the salvation from boredom not in relentless activity or in entertainment, which modern technology indulges in every way, but in tuning to even deeper boredom. Normally, boredom is in a dormant state, and by indefatigable activity and entertainment we only put it to sleep even more. The deeper the boredom, the more hidden it is. Displeasure arising from boredom pushes us from its depth (the third type of boredom, according to Heidegger) to its surface, to a light, superficial boredom (the first and second types of boredom). Yet, only by reaching the very bottom of boredom, by making latent boredom manifest, we can get out of it. Getting out of boredom would mean not only alleviating suf erance: since deep boredom is what locks us, it can also tell us what exactly is locked and what should be unlocked (Heidegger, very cinematically, calls the moment of such unlocking Augenblick, “glance of the eye”). It is in this sense that boredom is “the hidden pull of a sought-for homeland”, that is, a craving for disclosure of our ultimate abilities. Therefore, one who is bored is required to wake up boredom and—what is harder—to keep it from falling asleep. For this, however, we do not need to do anything, because “we always do too much”: we need to wait. Isn’t it what a good spectator does during a “boring” movie? And isn’t it cinema today that teaches us waiting above all other arts?

It is clear what kind of reproach Heidegger could make to cinema. First, in Heidegger’s perspective, the entertainment itself is a kind of Enframing—“putting” affects “together”. Second, cinema is Enframing inasmuch as it mechanically pulls the physical world out of the “unconcealed”, “enframes” it through framing, and then organizes it according to the rules of affective participation through editing, composition, and so on. The trembling foliage on the screen, which fascinated the first moviegoers, no longer satisfies us; we demand an entertaining plot and special effects.

According to Morin, cinema is a system that seeks to integrate the filmic stream into the spectator’s stream of consciousness, and vice versa. Cinema, “the son of Machine and Feeling,” is Machine in the sense that it organizes the psyche of the viewer, and Feeling in the sense that it is being saturated with the psyche of the viewer. As a result of the identification—projection, the spectator sees himself on the screen, sees his Feeling, and stops noticing the Machine. Identification
in Morin’s sense (“secondary”) eclipses identification in Baudry’s sense (“primary”). Today, only those who are not culturally trained to understand “the language of cinema”, that is, the rules of affective participation—such as children, primitives, or animals—are able to freely dissociate the images on the screen into abstract movements or singular objects: they see the Machine not yet the Feeling.

Entertaining movies strive to comply with all the found rules of the affective participation—from techniques that are designed to create a smooth flow of images, such as the 180-degree rule, to dramatic devices. Thus, entertaining movies hide the Machine that organizes the affective participation: on the screen, there is an allegedly pure Feeling, our subjectivity, “we ourselves.” Refusal to organize affective participation uncovers the Machine, and with this refusal the “deep” boredom is aroused.

There are several ways to uncover Machine in cinema, that is, to make the spectator feel boredom. First of all, it is “detheatralization” (term used by C. T. Dreyer25) and depsychoanalysis of the movie spectacle, that is, a direct removal of Feeling from the show: presenting the actors as “mummies” (Dreyer)26, “models” (Bresson)27, “spiritual automata” (Jancsó, Malick), “puppets” (Rohmer)28, galvanized bodies (Godard), somnambulists (Herzog), “zombies” (Pedro Costa), etc. An apotheosis of such “machinal” acting was, maybe, Herzog’s “Glass Heart”, where all the actors, relying on the director’s words, were put under hypnosis. Second, it is a violation of standard filmic rhythm—a deviation from smoothness (Godard) or, conversely, discontinuity (Straub–Huillet, M. Snow). Third, it is a violation of standard filmic tempo, a demonstration of superhuman, that is, essentially machine-based, capabilities of perception (Morin remarked that “if the language of the film is too slow or too fast, it detaches from affective participation and becomes, in both cases, abstract”29): excessively lengthy shots in Tarkovsky, Angelopoulos, Antonioni, Dreyer, Ackerman, Michael Snow, Lisandro Alonso, Albert Serra, Lav Diaz, Weerasethakul, etc. Probably, an apotheosis of such technique was a static eight-hour sequence in Warhol’s “Empire”. Today, the dominant way to induce boredom in spectator is slowing down the tempo and deviating from the standard discontinuity (as a response to more and more accelerating sequences in “popular” movies), but the influence of Bressonian “models” is also present (e.g. in films of Serge Bozon or Pierre Léon).

The entertaining movies don’t eliminate boredom, as it is inscribed into the very cinematic medium. These films only lull boredom by organizing affective participation: the viewer feels entertained because of a shift in mood (by passing, in Heidegger’s terms, from the second type of boredom to the first one; from a more deep to a more superficial one), but continues to be bored unknowingly. Boredom, which drives people to the cinema, takes there merely lighter forms, and precisely this gives them a feeling of “relaxation”. Only those films that deliberately deepen boredom, at the cost of viewers’ displeasure, can heal from it.

It is paradoxical that the Machine, being a source of boredom, seeks to dispel it. Machine is able to dispel boredom only by subjugating the viewer to itself in a hidden way. To make unconscious submission to the screen conscious would be to uncover a Machine behind it: only when we realize that in the movie hall we function like a machine, that in the cinema the machine operates as a natural part of ourselves, can we go through boredom (Joseph Brodsky quotes Robert Frost in his essay “In Praise of Boredom”: “‘The best way out is always through’”). From the point of view of the history of cinema, this will be a return to the experience of the first moviegoers, to the cinema before Méliès (similar to Heidegger’s return to pre-Socratic philosophers). A distinct desire for this return can be found, for example, in Straub–Huillet.

As in a detective novel, a key to a puzzle of boredom in cinema was given at the very beginning of its history—in the films of Lumière brothers. In the conventionally first movie—“The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat”—one machine (camera) meets another (train) at the station, like a lover weary of waiting for his beloved. The joy of a first moviegoer was the joy of their encounter after the long separation: their meeting symbolized a hope for the end of the alienation of the human being from himself. Movies seem to have been delegated from the world of industrial technology, several centuries after its occurrence, in order to return to the human being the mystery that the technology concealed. In cinema, techne and poiesis can become one again.

Cinema, being the first art born of Modern industrial technology, is phenomenologically constituted by the experience of boredom. Therefore, to the extent that boredom is the “hidden destiny” of modernity, cinema has a privilege over other arts in revealing this destiny. Today, in the face of new media and TV series, which disperse our attention and tend to lull boredom, this mission of cinema is as relevant as never before.

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