Hegel’s Double Anthropology: Anthropological Dimensions of the Theory of Sittlichkeit

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Abstract: Besides “Anthropology 1”, which deals in an original way with the mind-body problem, there is in Hegel’s philosophy of the objective spirit a theory of the constitution of humanity (here called Anthropology 2) focusing on the analysis of culture, in particular of material culture through labour activity.

Keywords: Anthropology; culture; Hegel; mind-body problem; social philosophy.

Since a long time, anthropology is nothing more than the name of a field of study.
M. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*

One point is certain: man is not the oldest or most constant problem that has ever faced human knowledge.
M. Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*

When investigating Hegel’s anthropology, it is first appropriate to clarify a point of terminology. By “anthropology” do we understand the content of the so-titled part of the theory of subjective spirit in the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, or Hegel’s conception of man in general? Iring Fetscher’s classic book, *Hegels Lehre vom Menschen*, is a comment on the whole theory of the subjective spirit. Fetscher was perfectly conscious of the fact that Hegel, in this section of the *Encyclopaedia*, uses the word “anthropology” in a very specific sense, and one that is specific to him. As stated in a footnote to the book:

The word ‘anthropology’ had a different meaning in Hegel’s time than today, but it was far from the very special meaning Hegel has given it.¹

Meanwhile, the knowledge of the global background in which Hegel’s anthropology was elaborated has increased significantly. Odo Marquard, in particular, has retraced the development of this notion, which has become the title of a scientific discipline, and the difficulties faced by the anthropological topic.² My purpose here is not to identify Hegel’s position in the complex history of anthropology, but rather to investigate the systematic meaning of Hegel’s theory of man in general. My conjecture is that this theory of man, which for the sake of brevity I call ‘Anthropology 2’, does neither coincides with anthropology in the special sense of the

² Marquard 1971; Marquard 1973, p. 122-44.
term (which I will now call ‘Anthropology 1’), i.e., with the theory of the 'soul' in the sense given to this term by Hegel, nor with the theory of the subjective spirit, as Fetscher assumed; it corresponds rather to the theory of the finite spirit, thus to the theory of the subjective and objective spirit.\(^3\)

And within Anthropology 2, I wish to highlight the special position of the investigation of man’s status in civil society. To what extent is man in general identical with the agent of the system of needs, i.e. with *homo oeconomicus*? This is one of the main questions to be addressed by the examination of Anthropology 2.

**Anthropology, before Kant and after Hegel**

According to Marquard, the rise of philosophical anthropology since the first appearance of the word in the 16th century must be understood as an alternative to the traditional (Scholastic, then Wolffian) School metaphysics on the one hand, and to the paradigm of the mathematical science of nature on the other.\(^4\) He notes that there is also a ‘theological' use of the term, examples of which can be found in Malebranche and Leibniz, but also in the *Encyclopédie* and even, at least until the middle of the 19th century, in the *Grand Dictionnaire de l’Académie française*. In the latter's sense, anthropology would be an incomplete human translation of divine concepts. However, Marquard immediately admits that no connection can be found between the two semantic fields, for example in the sense that philosophical anthropology would be a kind of secularization of theological anthropology. Philosophical anthropology provides an understanding of man that brings together empirical, physical, and ethnographic data in order to propose a comprehensive view of the nature of man. According to Mareta Linden, these analyses occur on a threefold level: there is a 'somatic' anthropology performed by medical doctors and scientists, which is dominant in the mid-18th century; a 'psychological' anthropology, which is metaphysical in the broader sense of the term; and finally, a combination of the two previous ones, dealing with what is now called the mind-body problem.\(^5\)

Although soul is one of the main subjects of anthropology, it is nevertheless evident that the ‘anthropological turn’ of philosophy during the 18th and 19th centuries represents a certain ‘dethronement of the soul’, or at least a depreciation of the spiritualist understanding of it.\(^6\)

During the Enlightenment, anthropology takes an anti-metaphysical


\(^4\) Marquard 1973, p. 124

\(^5\) See Linden 1976.

orientation, since it proceeds – and not only among materialists thinkers such as d’Holbach or La Mettrie – to a certain “physicalising of the soul”.\(^7\) I leave aside here the case of Kant, whose conception of anthropology would deserve a more detailed examination. Even in the case of an "idealistic" like Hegel, the anthropology \(^1\) goes in this direction, since its subject is "the soul in its corporeity".\(^8\) This trend, however, culminates in post-Hegelian philosophy, in particular with Feuerbach, who completely identifies the “new philosophy” he intends to promote with anthropology. The *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* affirm that theology and speculative philosophy must “dissolve” in anthropology, so that this discipline can and must become the “universal science”.\(^9\) Anthropology reveals “the secret of theology”, and thus of metaphysics and speculative philosophy;\(^10\) its goal, indeed, is to make man, instead of God, the primary subject of philosophy, since “God is the manifest interiority, the expressed Self of man", and religion, “the self-consciousness of man".\(^11\) In so doing, anthropology becomes an anthropodicy. This is the reason why Marx wants to eliminate anthropology as well as philosophy itself by giving it a practical turn: once Feuerbach has dissolved the “religious essence”, one must unveil the abstraction of man himself, and understand the “human essence" as the “totality of social relationships".\(^12\) In such a way, the program of the anthropological conversion of philosophy is superseded by that of a conversion of speculative theory into praxis:

> It is where speculation ceases, it is in actual life that actual, positive science begins, the presentation of practical activation (*Betätigung*) of the process of practical human development.\(^13\)

On the basis of such premises, there is no more space for any kind of philosophical anthropology: it is indeed a denial of the grounding of thinking in “the language of real life”.\(^14\) This is why the revival of philosophical anthropology, as it took place in various forms in the twentieth century, especially in Germany, implied not only, in Marquard’s

\(^7\) Nowitzki 2003, p. 29.

\(^8\) Hegel 1992, § 411, p. 419.

\(^9\) Feuerbach 1959a, § 1, p. 245; § 54, p. 317.

\(^10\) Feuerbach 1959b, § 1, p. 222;

\(^11\) Feuerbach 1959c, p. 15-16.

\(^12\) Marx 1969a, These 6, p. 6.

\(^13\) Marx 1969b, p. 28.

words, a “secession” from the philosophy of history and a “turn to nature”, but a re-definition – a critical re-definition – of the theory itself, which should, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, open the way to a “dialectical anthropology”.

Hegel’s “Anthropology 1”

In Hegel’s various published and unpublished accounts of anthropology, three points are noteworthy. 1) Hegel does not once attempt to explain the use of this name for that part of the theory of the subjective spirit whose subject is the ‘soul’ in the specific sense in which he understands it, as if it were self-evident that an anthropology should deal primarily with the spirit “that is not yet spirit”, with what forms “the sleep of the spirit”. To justify this option, he simply refers to “what is usually called anthropology”. 2) Hegel’s inquiry is restricted to a unique question, that of the rooting of the spirit in naturality, in this case in the body. The subject of anthropology, in reality, is the soul understood as “natural spirit (Naturgeist)”, so that it can be viewed in its entirety as a “psychic physiology”, although Hegel himself uses this expression in a more limited sense. 3) Despite its narrow scope, the Anthropology 1 is treated widely in the Encyclopaedia, and especially in the Berlin lectures on the philosophy of the subjective spirit: 75 pages in the Hotho copybook from the summer semester of 1822, more than 200 pages in the von Griesheim copybook from the summer semester of 1825, 150 pages in the Stolzenberg copybook from the winter semester of 1827-1828. This fact, although merely quantitative, indicates the significance of the anthropological issue for Hegel. Rather than providing a complete overview of the ‘Anthropology’ section of the Encyclopaedia and the lessons on the subjective spirit, I will simply address the three issues listed above.

1) The issue of naming: It is quite obvious that Hegel uses the word ‘anthropology’ as a simple label for a more conventional field of knowledge. He frequently uses expressions such as “what is usually called anthropology” to emphasise that it is not a personal choice.

16 Horkheimer-Adorno 2003, p. 17.
therefore obvious that what is exposed under this name does not provide an exhaustive theory of man (what I call Anthropology 2). Rather, it seems that the considerable expansion of anthropological studies since the mid-eighteenth century has rendered this kind of knowledge a standard discipline whose name can be modified as little as that of geometry. Moreover, this label is far from being an arbitrary one, and hence remains relevant even within the framework of Hegel’s philosophical system: the philosophical anthropology whose justification Hegel asserts against the “doctors’ anthropology” deals with human nature insofar as it is only nature.

2) Although Hegel takes up a traditional denomination, he narrows the conceptual content of the discipline of anthropology, whereas post-Kantian anthropology on the contrary aims to elevate itself to the rank of a discipline of universal relevance. For him, it is not the task of anthropology to provide a description of man in general, and it has much less to do with normative issues. Anthropology is therefore neither a pragmatic anthropology nor a moral anthropology in the sense of Kant: its main subject is the mind-body problem. In order to prevent this problem from becoming “an incomprehensible mystery”, the spirit-body relationship must be conceived, unlike in the old metaphysics, not as that of two separate things or substances, matter and mind, but as a dynamic of emergence. So understood, the Anthropology 1 is a psychophysiology considering “the spirit in its corporeity”, or “the spirit sunk into materiality”. Its aim is to describe the emergence of the spiritual from within the natural constitution of living beings, in other words the “spiritualisation” (Begeistung) of the living body, which is simultaneously a “corporalization of the spiritual” (Verleiblichung des Geistigen). The selected words deserve to be considered. In the “Philosophy of Nature”, Hegel uses the verb begeisten (which is rarely used) and the word Begeistung (which is not even listed in the Brothers Grimm dictionary!) to designate chemical processes, such as the acid/base reaction or the oxidation, which is a ‘spiritualization’ in the sense that ancient chemists spoke of the wine spirit to denote ethanol. But it also happens, for example in the Phenomenology of Spirit, that he uses these words to refer to a process of concretization which “spiritually

22 See Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Einleitung, AA VI, p. 217.
26 Hegel 1992, § 401, p. 399.
animates" abstract thoughts or “gives [them] spirit”. In a certain sense, then, certain chemical processes can be seen as a prefiguration of the emergence of the spirit within natural corporeity. Corporalization (*Verleiblichung*), on the other hand, describes the way in which internal sensations are bodily reflected. Anyway, the core of the Anthropology 1 is the study of semi-passive behaviors which, like sensations or habits, show the emergence of a spiritual activity (in a very broad sense) within a thick layer of corporal passivity: this is what Hegel calls the “muted weaving of the spirit”.

3) One can thus understand Hegel's constant attention to the dynamics (positive and negative) of the psyche, and especially to its pathologies. Indeed, the *Encyclopaedia* dedicates a single paragraph, accompanied by a long remark, to madness (*Verrücktheit*): § 321 in the first edition, § 408 in the second and third. But the unusual length of his oral explanations of this “condition of extreme wrenching” shows how important this and other abnormal situations are to him. Indeed, in such instances we are faced with a kind of reification of spiritual activity which shows the inseparability of corporality and spirituality. The pathologies of subjectivity are, so to speak, a proof of the very existence of soul, since the “disease of the soul” consists in the fact that “what belongs to the soul becomes separated from the spirit”. The “soul”, which in the normal (healthy) condition is the simple psychophysical basis of human spiritual activity, becomes in certain pathological cases a distinct reality, and this is expressed in a split in the corporeity itself. With this very modern idea of a split between corporeity and subjectivity when the latter, in its pre-reflective stage, has not yet reached consciousness, Hegel, as some scholars have pointed out, addresses topics that will acquire a systematic articulation in Freud’s work. One could possibly explain this at first sight hazardous linkage as follows: when the soul reaches an autonomous bodily existence, anthropology itself becomes anthropoiatry.

In general, beyond the mind-body problem, Hegel’s Anthropology 1 sheds new light on the ancient debate between idealism and materialism. In his reflections on ‘natural spirit’, the absolute idealist Hegel is developing arguments that could easily be described as materialist,

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28 Hegel 2018, p. 21, 463.

29 It is well known that the distinction between Körper and Leib is hardly translatable: Husserl’s translators experienced this difficulty.


31 Hegel 2011, § 408 Zusatz, p. 1036.


33 *Ibid*.

34 See Žižek 2011; Pagès 2015.
because he considers seriously (in what can be called an emergentist conception of spirit) the idea that the spirit is rooted in corporeity: He believes that it is precisely when the spirit and its bodily base become disconnected that the former ceases to be with itself. Obviously – one might recall the ruthless critique of phrenology in chapter five of the Phenomenology of Spirit – spirit is not a bone; but neither is it an etheric effluence.  

Hegel’s “Anthropology 2”

It is obvious that the Anthropology 1 does not provide a comprehensive theory of what the human being is. Moreover, although anthropological inquiry plays an important role in the theory of the subjective spirit, Hegel intentionally narrows its scope: its only aim is to explain the emergence of the spirit within and from natural corporeity. Moreover, even the whole theory of the subjective spirit, which adds to Anthropology 1 the “short” Phenomenology of Spirit and Psychology, is unable to provide an exhaustive theory of what mankind is, nor of what spirit is according to Hegel. If it is true – what I must presuppose here – that the basic determination of the spirit is freedom understood as being close to oneself in otherness to oneself (Beisichsein im Anderen), then it is required that the spirit frees itself from its mere subjective interiority. The spirit must provide reality to its inner freedom by embedding it in objective patterns (legal relations; domestic, social and political institutions), and thus acquire a reflexive self-knowledge. Freedom should not be understood as a predicate of a self-enclosed subjectivity, it is rather the objectivation of an interiority which is only constituted in and by this objectivating process. Only when the subjective spirit, which is therefore not only my spirit, sees in the legal-institutional framework of the social and political world the condition for realizing its own claims that it can really be near itself (bei sich); it must conceive of otherness (other subjects, the social world) not as an external given or as a potential hindrance, but as an objective requirement for the building of his own subjectivity. To Hegel, the main barrier of an accurate understanding of the subjective spirit is the representation of spirit as a


36 I will not deal here with the relationship between the Encyclopedia’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” and the 1807 work, the examination of which raises some fundamental problems concerning the structure of Hegel’s system and its evolution. On this subject, see my article “La Phénoménologie de l’esprit est-elle la fondation ultime du système hégélien?”, in: G. Marmasse and A. Schnell (eds.), Comment fonder la philosophie? L’idéalisme allemand et la question du principe premier, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2014, p. 243-264.

separated substance, as “a thing”.\textsuperscript{38} The whole of Anthropology 1, as well as the analysis of recognition in the “short” Phenomenology of Spirit and that of the practical spirit in Psychology, is intended to understand the spirit as a dynamic, a “development”.\textsuperscript{39} Such a conception is contrary to any substantialist understanding of the spirit; moreover, it prevents a formalistic view of freedom as a divergence from a world ruled by necessity, and forbids any objectivist view of the social world. Therefore, the shift from the subjective to the objective spirit is a condition for an accurate understanding of freedom and of the spirit itself, since the objectivation and institutionalization of freedom is what makes possible the stabilization of subjectivity itself:

While the subjective spirit, because of its relation to an Other, remains unfree or - what is the same thing - is free only in itself, in the objective spirit freedom, the knowledge that the spirit has of itself as free, comes to being-there.\textsuperscript{40}

How do such observations affect the broader conception of man, and thus what I call Anthropology 2, if it is true that the latter is something other than “what is called the knowledge of men”?\textsuperscript{41} According to Hegel, the human being should not be considered as a mere subject existing “naturally” by itself, but as a being that has to be constituted through a process of objectivation. This objectivation is particularly required since the concept of spirit, and therefore also that of humanity, cannot be defined by means of purely intellectual factors. In short, the human being is not a “thinking thing”, as Descartes describes it.\textsuperscript{42} Of course, Hegel does not give up defining human beings by thinking: for him also thinking is “what human beings have of more proper [and] by which they differ from animals.”\textsuperscript{43} But we must avoid a purely representational view of the spirit, identifying thinking only with the intellelctive activities. In the \textit{Science of Logic}, Hegel emphasizes that knowledge has a normative as well as a cognitive dimension: the “idea of the true” must be completed by the “idea of the Good”, in such a way that the concept no longer faces the objective world; it is not only imbued with it, but also determines it and pervades it.\textsuperscript{44} Likewise, in the \textit{Philosophy of spirit}, the subjective

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Hegel 1992, § 389, p. 388.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} See Hegel 1992, § 442, p. 436: “The proceed of the Spirit is a development”.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Hegel 2011, § 385 Zusatz, p. 940.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Hegel 1992, § 377, p. 379.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Descartes 1967, p. 419.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Hegel 1992, § 400, p. 398.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Hegel 2010a, p. 729.
\end{itemize}
spirit should not be understood only as a theoretical spirit, but also as a practical spirit, a spirit whose “path” consists in “making itself an objective spirit” and thus in “ascending to the thinking will.”\textsuperscript{45} Hegel derives from this insight a very innovative consequence: freedom, as a distinctive determination of the spirit, is not an idea that men have but rather the idea that they are:

> If the knowledge [...] that men have of what their essence, their goal and object is freedom, is speculative, this Idea itself is, as such, the actuality of men, not the idea they have of it, but the idea they are.\textsuperscript{46}

The statement that humans are the idea of freedom means that the “knowledge of the Idea” is embodied less in subjective thoughts and representations than in institutional forms of objectivation of freedom; it is a notable example of Hegel’s institutionalism, which in my opinion remains “weak” in the sense that it allows subjectivity, in the whole range of its expressive forms, a significant degree of autonomy.\textsuperscript{47}

The doctrine of abstract law, i.e., broadly speaking, of private (civil and criminal) law, provides an interesting example of the objectivation of the spirit; I have in mind here the thesis that man does not by nature enjoy self-ownership, but has to acquire it through a work of self-appropriation. Just as the legal person has to take possession of a thing through effective use in order to become its legal owner,\textsuperscript{48} so the human being has to “take possession of himself” in order to not remain a mere “natural entity”:

> The human being, in his immediate existence in himself, is a natural entity, external to his concept; it is only through the development of his own body and spirit, essentially by means of his self-consciousness comprehending itself as free, that he takes possession of himself and becomes his own property as distinct from that of others. Or to put it the other way around, this taking possession of oneself consists also in translating into actuality what one is in terms of one’s concept [...] By this means, what one is in concept, is posited for the first time as one’s own.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{45} Hegel 1992, § 469, p. 466.

\textsuperscript{46} Hegel 1992, § 482, p. 477.

\textsuperscript{47} See Kervégan 2018, p. 279-82.


\textsuperscript{49} Hegel 1991, § 57, p. 86.
The normative impermissibility of slavery and serfdom follows from this: such situations, which contravene the egalitarian formalism of the law, negate the humanity of certain human beings by reducing them to “an existence not in conformity with [their] concept”, that of mere “natural beings.” The originality of the argument must be considered. If slavery is an “absolute denial of right (absolutes Unrecht)”, it is not because it is contrary to the "nature" of man, but rather because humanity is not something natural: Hegel repudiates the jusnaturalist rejection of slavery as well as its usual "historical" justification. Because humanity is to be acquired through the “hard work” of culture, one should not be deprived of it through violence or oppression. Paradoxically, humanity should be understood as a “second nature”, socially constructed, inalienable by the mere fact that it is “the world of spirit produced from within itself." The human individual being is thus a social being (in the widest sense of the word, corresponding to what Hegel calls Sittlichkeit), a being who “is free, in possession of himself, only through culture”, so that we can legitimately speak of a social construction of human individuality. As Habermas points out in his essay “Arbeit und Interaktion”, “it is only with socialization that individuation happens.”

However, it is important to consider this culture of humanity in its full extension, namely as “practical” as well as “theoretical culture”. In his Jena writings, Hegel especially emphasizes the relevance of the non-intellectual component of culture. Like the language, work, as a “rational medium” between conscience and the external world, is an essential factor in universalizing the relationship to the world, and therefore in the humanization of the natural individual. Work is as a field of material culture, a ‘thinking’ process in the sense that it generates universality, as can be observed by examining modern forms of working activity, based on the “abstraction of production” – but this should not blind us to the negative, alienating side of this abstraction: on this and many other points, Hegel is Marx’s forerunner. In opposition to the “formal” character of conscience which, insofar as it is “something subjective”, has “no

52 Hegel 1991, § 4, p. 35.
53 Hegel, handwritten note to the § 57 of the Philosophy of Right, in: Hegel 2010b, p. 437.
54 Habermas 1968, p. 15-16.
56 Hegel 1975, fragment 20, p. 300.
genuine reality”, Hegel strongly emphasizes the rationality, the thinking and socializing - in short, universalizing - character of work:

Work is not *instinct*, but a rationality which, in the people, becomes something universal and which is, for this reason, contrary to the individual’s singularity, which has to be overcome; and exactly for this reason, the work act is not present there as an *instinct*, but in the manner of spirit, in the sense that work, taken as a *subjective activity of the individual, has become something else*, a universal rule; and the cleverness of the individual is only acquired through this learning process, through coming back to oneself by becoming other than oneself.\(^\text{59}\)

As an acting as much as a speaking and representative being, as a practical spirit as much as a theoretical one, the human being is, as Feuerbach and Marx would say, a “generic being” (*Gattungswesen*).\(^\text{60}\) This argument about the social character of mankind has various expressions in Hegel. One of the most famous is the criticism of the “robinsonnade” (to use Marx’s words) of a “so-called state of nature, in which [man] had only so-called natural needs”.\(^\text{61}\) Against such representations, Hegel stresses the growing “abstract”, social character of work, leading to a “multiplication of his needs and means”.\(^\text{62}\) Of course, this rejection of the jusnaturalist fictions, especially that of the state of nature, is not Hegel’s invention. Such views were especially promoted by the eighteenth-century Scottish school. Ferguson writes, for example:

If we were asked therefore, where is the state of nature to be find? we may answer, It is here [...] While this active being is in the train of employing his talents, and of operating on the subjects around him, all situations are equally natural. [...] In the condition of the savage, as well as in that of the citizen, are many proofs of human invention; and in either is not in any permanent station, but a mere stage through which this travelling being is destined to pass. If the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less; and the highest refinements of political and moral apprehension, are not more artificial in their kind, than the first operations of sentiment and reason.\(^\text{63}\)

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58 Hegel 1975, fragment 20, p. 286.
59 Hegel 1975, fragment 20, p. 320.
63 Ferguson 1782, p. 12-3.
The state of society is the genuine state of nature: this was already the *communis opinio doctorum* at the end of the 18th century. A modern version of the old Roman maxim *ubi societas, ibi jus*, might therefore be formulated as follows: *ubi societas, ibi homo*.

From this idea, Hegel draws a far-sighted conclusion: in modern civil society, ‘human being’ is no longer just a conceptual term or the name of a class of individuals, it is now a social reality finding its sphere of activity in the market society:

In the law, the object is the *person*; at the level of morality, it is the *subject*, in the family, the *family-member*, and in civil society in general, the *citizen* (in the sense of *bourgeois*). Here, at the level of needs, it is that concretum of *representational thought* which we call *the human being*; this is the first, and in fact the only occasion on which we shall refer to *the human being* in this sense.\(^64\)

Like abstract work, abstract human being is a result of modern forms of socialization. By reducing the individual to the abstract characteristics of *homo oeconomicus*, a mere vehicle for workforce, the “system of needs” for the first time gives this abstract representation of Humanity a concrete social reality. The socialized individual, the *bourgeois* (in the sense of Rousseau rather than of Marx), is the human being in general, performing abstract work and thus acquiring a distinct social existence. By depriving the human individual of all the statutory attributes with which the order society had endowed him, civil (*bourgeois*) society has literally created the human being; it thus provided a tangible basis for the abstract language of human rights. It is therefore no mere coincidence, as Marx polemically but accurately pointed out, that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen is contemporaneous with the rise of the market society:\(^65\) they are, as Hegel had also seen it, correlative expressions of the birth of the Man, of which Foucault will draw up the death certificate one and a half century later.

Is the scope of Anthropology 2, if this denomination is that of a complete theory of Man, thus exhausted? Obviously not. In Hegel’s system, man is not only the socialized *bourgeois*, the producer-consumer; he also assumes, as listed in § 190 of the *Grundlinien*, the roles of the legal person, the moral subject and the family member, to which we can add the roles of political citizen and possible author or addressee of works of art, religion, and philosophy. But the naked man, the ‘man without qualities’, is still for Hegel closely related to the modern abstraction of the market society. From this perspective, his anthropology remains an inexhaustible source for any critical theory of society, even after man’s death.

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\(^64\) Hegel 1991, § 190, p. 228 (modified).

BIBLIOGRAPHY